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 1 
Introduction 
Among economists, there exists an unrivalled consensus on the desirability of free trade. This 
consensus includes both the endorsement of liberalization (as a policy-induced process of economic 
change) and the endorsement of free trade (as a state of affairs). Surveys of professional economists 
show that there is an identifiable mainstream economic argument on trade policy.1 This does not mean 
that economists agree on the desirability of trade agreements or on the minutiae of trade policy – but 
that there is agreement on the general case for free trade, which is the argument under investigation 
here.  
The mainstream argument draws on microeconomic argumentation. Indeed, the basic way 
international trade is conceptualized is as an application of more general microeconomic principles. 
This conceptualization is widely taken for granted. Trade theory and microeconomic theory have 
historically developed in close proximity, so that advances in microeconomic theory have 
automatically also advanced trade theory. Philosophical and methodological critiques of contemporary 
trade theory (of which there are few) must hence pay attention to microeconomic theory (of which 
there are plenty of critiques). The different approach taken here is to look at normative trade theory 
from the perspective of contemporary political philosophy.2 If a political philosopher were to pick up a 
textbook of international economics, what would strike her as particularly noteworthy? 
This case study is a critical exposition of what mainstream economists present as being good 
trade policy – and of what the implicit normative assumptions of the theoretical arguments presented 
are. I will argue that, together, these tenets amount to something that merits the term neoclassical 
vision.3 I will argue that the way international trade is treated by economists in textbooks and in public 
argument is the most pronounced instance of a neoclassical vision of the economy. Here, economists 
are political philosophers. 
Section 1 describes textbooks as transmission vehicles for the neoclassical vision. Section 2 
analyzes the ethical foundations of normative trade theory and shows how comparative advantage and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency arguments introduce further normative commitments. Section 3 shows how 
these normative assumptions are then translated into policy recommendations. Section 4 outlines what 
trade economists believe to be natural and fair (re)distributions. Section 5 derives the role that politics 
plays in the textbook account and scrutinizes how economists justify their philosophical views. The 
last section concludes. 
 
1.1 Textbooks as Transmission Vehicles of the Neoclassical Vision 
The main body of reference will be undergraduate (and occasionally, graduate) textbooks. These are 
important transmission vehicles in at least two respects. First, while journal articles represent ongoing 
debates in economics, textbooks represent received theory (Johansson, 2004). Textbooks, hence, 
reflect the dominant discourse of a discipline, and summarize the state of the art that has to be 
transferred to the next generation of scholars. Second, textbooks are the entry point of students into the 
discipline. Especially in economics, textbooks have an important, though largely unwritten, history of 
their own.4 In Anglo-American universities, economics is taught largely through textbooks. 5 The 
                                                     
1
 See surveys by Kearls et al. (1979), Frey et al. (1984), Alston et al. (1992), Fuller (2003), Whaples (2006, 2009), Klein & 
Stern (2007).  
2
 Broadly understood as the “philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life - our political institutions and 
our social practices” (Miller, 1998, p.1). 
3
 George DeMartino has coined the term neoclassical vision. In this paper, I use a broader definition that encompasses the 
totality of implicit and explicit normative assumptions that concern the social and political good of a society and which 
are expressive of a neoclassical political philosophy. 
4
 Think of the lineage from Alfred Marshall’s “Principles” (1890) to Paul Samuelson’s “Economics” (1948) to Greg 
Mankiw’s “Principles of Economics” (2007). Textbooks are enormously influential, and while scholarly critique and 
reception of these works shapes their content in later editions to some extent (Giraud, 2011), generally, textbooks in 
economics have tended to reflect and cement, rather than to challenge, orthodoxy. See for instance the recent so-called 
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market for economics textbooks itself (at least in microeconomics and in international economics) is 
fairly oligopolistic: a few blockbuster textbooks dominate the market. 
Trade textbooks have rarely been studied with regards to the kind of normative arguments 
made within them.6 For example, there is no analysis that asks specifically what underlying theories of 
(distributive) justice can be uncovered from the premises found in textbooks and in economic 
teaching. There are only a few examples of scrutiny of textbooks from a broadly normative point of 
view from within the discipline of economics: DeMartino (2002) cites textbooks when he attacks the 
theory and policy recommendations of what he terms the neoclassical vision. Driskill (2012), for 
instance, analysed textbooks, as well as popular writings by economists, focusing specifically on the 
normative premises of the trade theory chapters in Krugman and Obstfeld’s textbook. Driskill argues 
that standard arguments employ misleading analogies, make empirical leaps of faith and intentionally 
obfuscate implicit value judgments, presenting an “incomplete and misleading case” for free trade 
where “one would hope for the best analysis the profession has to offer” (p. 6). In what follows, I will 
argue that Driskill is right, but that the situation is even more serious than he thinks. At the end of this 
investigation, another reason why textbooks are important may become apparent. They tend to matter 
as vehicles, wittingly or unwittingly, of a political philosophy of a special kind. This would conform to 
the statement ascribed to Paul Samuelson: “I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws, or crafts its 
advanced treaties, if I can write its economics textbooks”. 
The brand of political philosophy we find in textbooks is the neoclassical vision. Its essential 
features are the following: the neoclassical vision advocates for efficiency as a demand of justice. The 
free market is the optimal social organizing mechanism, and market orders are regarded as natural and 
their resulting socio-economic distributions as fair. Politics should serve the market; redistributive 
complications, if they arise at all, can be largely ignored. Polities should and will follow the policy 
recommendations of orthodox economics, and particularly those made by economists. The 
neoclassical vision justifies an elevated role of the economist as making authoritative decisions about 
right and wrong, and as being the guardian of efficiency against competing social values. Yet 
rhetorically, despite making arguments about the social and political good of societies, the 
neoclassical vision pretends to not be rooted in any specific philosophical tradition. It presents itself as 
neither historically situated nor as relying on distinct ethical or political philosophical commitments. 
This inherent contradiction is most clearly visible in the pedagogy of the sub-discipline of normative 
trade theory. 
 
1.2 Textbooks Are Special 
Textbooks in economics are special. They are special in the sense that there are almost no textbooks 
that introduce the student to alternatives to mainstream economics. This is mostly, as could be argued, 
because the majority of economics texts do not situate themselves within the history of economics. 
The prevalent understanding about economics is one that assumes that today’s dominant approach is 
(Contd.)                                                                  
“Anti-Mankiw” movement (which is a play on the leftist critique of Samuelson by Linder & Sensat (1977) in their “Anti-
Samuelson”) in which Mankiw’s textbook is criticized (Anti-Mankiw-Blogging-Collective, 2012). See also Reddy & 
Chappe (2012) who engage in a public critical reading of Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995), arguably the most 
influential textbook in microeconomics today. Textbooks have only occasionally been the subject of investigation in the 
history of economics, despite their influence. 
5
 Throughout, I will draw most of my arguments directly from textbooks of international economics. Several textbooks cited 
in the bibliography represent the mainstream approach outlined here. The focus here is on textbooks used in the syllabi of 
English-speaking universities covering topics in international economics and microeconomics (mostly drawn from UK 
and US graduate programmes). See Lucier (1992) for an overview of the most influential textbooks and on the limits of 
rigorously studying textbooks of economics for practical reasons. 
6
 An eclectic mix of exceptions includes Feiner & Morgan (1987), Clawson (2002), Gray (1992), Feiner & Roberts (1990), as 
well as some works from heterodox economics (Keen, 2011; Lee & Keen, 2004). With respect to trade, there have only 
been a few critiques that engage with broader normative issues. An exception is the feminist economics movement, which 
has formulated specific problems with mainstream trade theory and gender (van Staveren, Elson, Grown & Cagatay, 
2012). While calls for reform of economics teaching have intensified following the 2007/8 global financial crisis and 
while these protests also scold mainstream economics for its normative commitments, these calls rarely refer to or cite 
works of political philosophers, nor do political philosophers pay much attention to heterodox economics and its quarrels. 
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simply the one that has “stood the test of time”. Alternative views were lacking in certain respects and 
have therefore not ‘survived’. Hence, textbooks subscribe to the Whig theory of the history of 
economics, as is often pointed out by economics methodologists (McCloskey, 1994). There is a 
second, somewhat paradoxical, sense in which economics textbooks are special, and unlike their 
counterparts in both hard and soft sciences. Contemporary textbooks in economics, and especially 
those that also engage in normative trade theory, present policy recommendations to their readers. 
Imagine the counterfactual oddity of a textbook in “applied political science” or “normative 
sociology” that gave concrete policy advice. Normative trade theory, on the other hand, seems 
founded on a distinct vision of what is desirable for society. It has been the task here to give this vision 
contours. As of yet, there is no comprehensive critique that attempts to show these contours within the 
mainstream arguments on trade policy. A critical investigation of textbooks matters because 
economics often prides itself on offering a counter-intuitive and often controversial new perspective 
on the social world that does not shy away from being applied to all domains of human life. Students 
who take Trade 101 classes may never go beyond the textbooks. Likewise, scholars from adjacent 
disciplines may all too easily take insights from textbooks as gospel, disseminating coarse-grained 
arguments from introductory texts into neighbouring fields (for trade, examples in law and philosophy, 
and political science come to mind).7 
 
1.3 The Structure of International Economics Textbooks 
International economics textbooks are traditionally divided in two parts: one deals with international 
trade theory and another one with international finance and international monetary theory. 8 The 
common distinction between positive and normative economics finds a physical representation in a 
clear division into chapters on positive trade theory on the one hand and chapters on normative trade 
theory on the other. These chapters build on microeconomic models, using both general and partial 
equilibrium analysis as their means of exposition. The standard microeconomic model used is static 
equilibrium analysis of two economies, in which one usually represents home, the other the rest of the 
world. This model assumes perfect mobility of the factors of production domestically but not globally, 
existing resources, full employment and perfect competition. Free trade is efficient and raises welfare, 
shifting outward both the production and consumption possibility frontiers, enabling a nation to 
produce and consume more. Free trade aids the efficient allocation of the trading countries’ resources 
and, usually, it is assumed that all trade is balanced. (Potential) preference satisfaction of individual 
economic agents is optimized, incomes and rents are distributed according to marginalist principles. 
Free trade is preferable to autarky, which would have to be enforced through protectionism.9 Free 
trade is desirable because it “enlarges the feasible consumption set for a community” (Winters, 1985, 
p. 56). It is now possible to obtain “commodity bundles which were out of reach under autarky” 
(Gandolfo, 1994, p. 54). Often, the case for free trade is phrased as the way that trade “allows one 
country to consume beyond its own ability to produce”, allowing a country to reach a higher 
community indifference curve. (Pugel, 2006, p. 38). It is treated as fact that there are net gains from 
free trade, “both for nations and the world” (p. 129). Pugel (2007) describes an ideal world as one in 
which private incentives are aligned perfectly with social benefits and costs, and incentives equalize at 
the margin. In this world of universal exchange, 
                                                     
7
 Much of this has to do with economics understanding itself as a science. There would be little use in advocating an 
‘alternative chemistry’ or ‘critical physics’ or ‘pluralist engineering’. If one sees, however, as I do, economics as a social 
science, one must complain that contemporary international trade theory, at least in its textbook representation, is one of 
the least reflexive contemporary social sciences. Just imagine a contemporary textbook in International Relations Theory 
that does not present different theories and explanations! This would be unacceptable as the core textbook for a graduate 
course. In fact, it would be the core purpose of the textbook to present different theoretical approaches 
8
 A broad survey of textbooks is provided by Lucier (1992). 
9
 Technically, protectionism is understood in economic theory as the use of measures such as tariffs and quotas to shelter 
domestic industries from global market prices. As will be seen, the scope of what counts as “protectionist” varies in 
textbooks. More narrative passages in textbooks often go beyond the narrow definition to include intervention in markets 
more generally. 
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[f]ree trade allows the ‘invisible hand’ of market competition to reach globally. Private producers, 
reacting to the signal of the market price, expand production in each country to levels that are as 
good as possible for the world as a whole. Private consumers, also reacting to price signals, 
expand their purchases of products to levels that make the whole world as well off as possible (p. 
186). 
 
The primary objective of textbooks is to show students the “elegance and coherence of the pure theory 
of international trade” (Lucier, 1992, p. 165). The content and order of models is an established 
tradition, facilitating the “continuity of exposition” (p. 163): “The pure theory of international trade – 
from mercantilism through Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Haberler, Heckscher, Ohlin, and Samuelson – is the 
foundation of an international trade course. All of the textbooks deal with this body of material” (p. 
165). Trade theory chapters usually provide summaries of the current state-of-the-art positive models 
that attempt to explain why countries trade and, less frequently, how empirical evidence favours some 
models over others (as a rule of thumb, more advanced textbooks have less empirical content).  
The basic model in all textbooks is traditional trade theory – the comparative-advantage-
based model with constant returns to scale in perfect competition. Introductory textbooks nearly 
always contain a similar narrative starting with Adam Smith’s theory of absolute advantage, followed 
by an exposition of Ricardian theories of comparative advantage, followed by chapters on – equally 
comparative-advantage-based – specific-factors models and factor-proportions models. Only then are 
assumptions gradually relaxed and other models of modern trade theory introduced. For instance, the 
effects of economies of scale are investigated or more recent theories and advances in international 
trade presented (gravity models; theories of the firm). Textbooks then usually proceed to deal with 
instruments of trade policy, evaluating tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints and other 
‘distortions’ to trade such as non-tariff barriers in chapters that are sometimes called applied trade 
theory. From the 1980s onwards, textbooks have also included chapters on strategic trade policy. 
Many texts conclude by looking at the economic effects of certain instruments currently proliferating 
in the area of international trade law (dumping, countervailing measures, other ‘unfair’ trade 
practices), mostly assessing trade policies at the WTO. This applied part at the international level is 
particularly frequent in newer textbooks.10  
All textbooks put forward trade policy recommendations in nearly identical manner, situated 
towards the end of chapters of normative trade theory, where the welfare effects of barriers to trade 
(tariffs etc.) are calculated. These policy recommendations are always based on a neoclassical 
narrative, citing the static efficiency effects of free trade.11 
Tariffs and other restrictions on trade are regarded as interferences with the efficient allocation 
that a competitive price system would entail. Barriers to free trade are regarded as distortions of an 
otherwise desirable social choice mechanism that is better left alone. And while there are also non-
neoclassical economic reasons that are efficiency arguments favouring free trade, the main arguments 
put forth in textbooks are those of the neoclassical static efficiency effects of trade only. Textbooks 
also mention dynamic arguments in favour of free trade, but only in passing and not as part of the 
neoclassical narrative. “Dynamic” refers to different positive spillover effects that could be the result 
of trade: increased competition, learning effects, adaptation of new technologies. What is true for the 
rhetoric of free trade advocacy has been described by Blaug (2007) as a more general feature of 
                                                     
10
 For a summary of changes in textbooks see Hoaas (1993). 
11
 To ascribe the term neoclassical to contemporary economic practice is common practice, particularly within the literature 
of heterodox economic critiques (Doubush & Kappeller, 2012; Dow, 2000; Gruchy, 1987; Lavoie, 2006; Lee & Keen, 
2004; Gerber & Steppacher, 2012; Garnett, Olsen & Starr, 2009; Harvey & Garnett, 2008; Foldvary, 1996; Backhouse, 
2000). Neoclassical economics also represents the unprecedented unification of concepts and methods (marginalism, 
individualist methodology and the concept of utility) that would have been completely foreign to the classical 
economists. It is this unification of style, techniques and rhetoric that provided fertile ground for the neoclassical vision. 
It is somewhat a historical misnomer to ascribe the term neoclassical to contemporary economic practice. It would be 
more apt to call the underlying vision on trade policy the Hicksian vision, based on the development of the new welfare 
economics that started with John R. Hicks. 
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argumentation in new welfare economics. Blaug argues that it is “the dynamic performance of 
capitalism that is its major achievement and yet when we study welfare economics, it is always the 
static efficiency of the capitalist economy that is trumpeted aloud” (p. 22, my emphasis). Free markets 
in trade are praised for their static, not their dynamic, efficiency. In short, they are endorsed on 
neoclassical grounds. Free markets increase choice, and choice means more possibilities for increasing 
individual utility. Markets are the best vehicle to further the individual choices of everyone. The 
market is seen as the mechanism that allows free exchange, and hence efficiency, to optimize. 
That trade should be free is the central conclusion of normative trade theory, not of positive 
trade theory. The exact mechanism through which recommendations (normative theory) are derived 
from descriptions of the world economy (positive theory) is, however, only rarely made explicit. As a 
sub-discipline of normative economics, it is normative trade theory that focuses on making “welfare 
judgments about policies and economic events” that are trade-related (Corden, 1984, p. 65), in which 
techniques of microeconomic analysis are used. The core argument in favour of trade is hence one 
rooted in microeconomic theory, but specifically in welfare analysis, stemming from John R. Hicks 
and the Ordinalists.  
Rather than explaining why countries trade in the first place (the pattern of trade) as does 
positive trade theory, normative trade theory compares the welfare implications of trade policies and 
therefore specifically looks at gains from trade (Jones & Kenen, 1984). Devices of trade intervention 
(tariffs, quotas, subsidies, different kinds of regulation) are examined with regard to their direct effects 
on welfare in microeconomic models. Consequently, normative trade theory aims to arrive at policy 
recommendations taking into account the nature of trade under different assumptions. Zis (1988) says 
that the “pure theory is [...] subdivided into the positive analysis, which deals with relations between 
objectively defined variables, and the welfare analysis, which attempts to evaluate alternate situations” 
(p. 2). International economists are even more explicit on how their insights relate to policy. Corden 
(1984) tells us that the very purpose of normative economic trade theory is prescriptive, proclaiming 
that the “usefulness of normative trade theory depends then on the readiness with which governments 
take the advice of economists who are trained in, and apply, this body of theory” (p. 66). This body of 
theory is built on the new welfare economics, where microeconomic theory is used to evaluate 
economic policies, institutions and distributive allocations. The support for free trade is neoclassical. 
Trade theory (positive and normative) is traditionally treated as a distinct branch of 
microeconomics – even though there are no distinct microeconomic techniques used when it comes to 
the analysis of the exchange of goods, services and factors across national borders. Hence, the 
underlying logic of a partial equilibrium analysis (effect of a tariff on price, demand and supply of a 
specific good) or of a general equilibrium analysis (effect on the economy in general) does not change 
whether we deal with trade within or across a nation. Partial or general equilibrium analyses can be 
used for applied welfare analysis.  
A standard example of applied welfare analysis in textbooks is the very simple welfare 
analysis of a tariff and its impact on consumer, producer and government surplus. The concept of 
economic surplus in this form stems from the marginalist Alfred Marshall. Consumer surplus is now 
defined to signify the “increase in the economic well-being of consumers who are able to buy the 
product at a market price lower than the highest price that they are willing and able to pay for the 
product” (Pugel, 2006, p. 19). Welfare is understood as identical to economic surplus. 
As tariffs are modelled as taxes on imported goods, standard microeconomic technique 
applies. This is an example of a microeconomic model applied to an issue of trade policy as is 
common in international economics textbooks. Either through graphical presentation or simple 
algebraic equations, it is shown that market equilibrium is, given specified conditions, economically 
efficient. The welfare analysis compares how consumer, producer and government surplus change 
under free trade and autarky respectively. The overall surplus under free trade is shown to be, in the 
standard case, greater than the overall surplus under autarky, modelled by the introduction of a tariff 
or some other form of trade restriction. Under free trade, the aggregate of consumer surplus together 
with producer surplus and government revenue (usually zero) is greater than under protectionism. 
Even when some agents are better off in terms of their surplus (e.g. there is more government revenue 
through a tariff), overall, it is argued that these restrictions on trade always result in social deadweight 
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loss. This term describes the foregone opportunity benefits had there been free trade, due to 
irretrievable costs that result from inefficiency. If a policy recommendation is drawn from this 
analysis, it is effectively a cost-benefit analysis comparing the disaggregated welfare effects on 
different groups in the economy, giving equal weight to each of them and their willingness (and 
ability) to pay to fulfil their preferences. Without much explanation of the factual requirements that 
this model has to meet, policy recommendations are usually drawn from this simplest welfare analysis 
alone. In what follows, I will argue that the array of assumptions (inter alia about welfare) endorsed in 
textbooks are not just ethical assumptions, but betray a vision of the social and political good and the 
kinds of institutions that should further it.  
 
2.1 Normative Trade Theory as Political Philosophy? 
Neoclassical trade theory does not deal with broad macroeconomic aggregates. Since Alfred Marshall 
and the historical neoclassical economists, economics has been characterized by a methodological 
individualism that attempts to model economic behaviour with reductionist microfoundations. 
Microeconomic theories model economic relations with reference to the individual choices of 
consumers, producers, households, firms and governments (rather than looking at the economy in 
broad aggregates, e.g. employment, growth and inflation, as macroeconomics does). The welfare 
analysis in partial or general equilibrium makes a certain array of factual assumptions about economic 
agents. Rationality is assumed, in the sense that individuals elect to perform actions that best realize 
their respective desires, whatever they may be12. Another fundamental assumption is that the desires 
that economic agents hold are derived from self-interest, often pecuniary or material interest. 
Crucially, that preferences are assumed to be rational is an imputation made by neoclassical theorists 
that is not based on empirical investigation but chosen on theoretical grounds (arguably, the core 
motivation is to have a concept of preferences that can be easily manipulated mathematically). Hence, 
preferences to be satisfied are those that rational people would want. Hands (2012) writes:  
 
Most of the ‘given’ wants of economics are posited wants rather than found wants, and they are 
not just any-old posited wants. They are posited rational wants. They are wants embodied in well-
behaved, complete and transitive preferences with sufficient structure to support the existence of 
an ordinal utility function defined over the entire choice space. So where do these posited 
restrictions come form? They involve rationality. The posited rational wants are motivated by our 
normative value judgments about what one “ought to do in order to be rational.” There is a reason 
that many elementary textbooks call the transitivity assumption “rationality” – it originates in our 
normative intuitions about the essential nature of rationality. This makes the rational choice 
foundations of welfare economics, and thus welfare economics, laden with normativity (p. 19, my 
emphasis).  
 
Fundamental to the neoclassical story, furthermore, is an assumption of material scarcity as a 
permeating, structural background condition, accompanied by the non-satisfiability of individual 
preferences. Scarcity is part of any definition of economics, yet the neoclassical overemphasis on 
scarcity as shaping economic action is indicative of an underlying normative vision. Scarcity arises 
relative to an inadequate satisfaction of individual wants, or, put differently, scarcity is the difference 
between what exists and what people want. The fact of scarcity necessitates that humans make choices 
among competing ends. Praxeologists such as von Mises have argued that scarcity is action-guiding 
even without any human interrelations – humans must decide how to spend their time, effort and 
attention. Yet there are two aspects to the concept of scarcity: individual wants and naturally available 
resources. The neoclassical vision, by (generally) stressing the non-satisfiability of preferences, entails 
                                                     
12
 Neoclassical theory deals with economic agents who know best for themselves what they want and how they can achieve 
it. Wesley Mitchell once argued that any author’s conception of economics “must be based upon his [sic] conception of 
human nature, tacit or expressed, so long as his [sic] system of economic theory consists of reasoning about what people 
will do” (as cited in Dobb, 1975, p.38). This methodological individualism is the analytical reduction of human 
behaviour and activity to individual actions. In mainstream economic theory, economics is nearly agnostic as to the 
ethical content of the preferences. These are taken as completely exogenous. 
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that scarcity is structural: wants can never be fully satisfied. In the neoclassical vision, constrained 
choice applies not only to consumption of goods or decisions to invest or save, but to all human 
decisions. Neoclassical economics potentially sees “all of life as the application of economic 
calculation, as economizing behaviour” (Caporaso and Levine). It thereby “erases the distinction 
between the economy and the other spheres of social interaction” (p. 81). To a modern economist, this 
may seem common-sensical (Galbraith, 1958). But the centrality of scarcity and the emphasis on it has 
only existed in contemporary economics since Lionel Robbins. With it comes a view of resources as 
being “structurally inadequate”. Individuals are restless, can never have what they want, always want 
more. This is a fundamental assumption concerning which very little normative work has been done 
recently (an exception is Zaman, 2010). 13 
 It is not the case that these conditions (rationality, scarcity, preference satisfaction and others 
that will be introduced later) cannot be relaxed. But policy recommendations that are put forward in 
textbooks rely on only these, rather than on alternative assumptions. Why is this the case? 
One answer is offered by Broome (2009), who argues that welfare economics is “badly 
neglected” within the profession. It is “little taught, and many economists know almost nothing of it” 
(p. 2). There is a large body of literature within modern welfare economics and social choice theory 
that deals specifically with questions like these: What is economic welfare? Which efficiency criteria 
are to be used? How should individual utilities be aggregated and social welfare functions created? 
And even though answers to these questions are preconditions for making meaningful policy 
recommendations in economics, alternative conceptions of welfare are never mentioned in textbooks. 
In fact, it is the very misnomer of the discipline of ‘welfare’ economics that is telling. Debates about 
values in economics and desirable visions for the economy cannot be adequately summarized by the 
term welfare. Yet this is what the sub-discipline has been exclusively focusing on. Implicitly, by 
restricting the scope of welfare in this way, trade theorists endorse a consequentialist view of ethics 
(where the effects of an action are the sole relevant criterion for evaluating an action as right or 
wrong). Textbooks rarely, if ever, provide references that would challenge its welfare economic 
foundations. I could not find a single reference in all the textbooks surveyed which would challenge 
neoclassical microeconomics or welfare economics itself. The term normative trade theory is hence 
today restricted to this narrow approach. 
In the neoclassical vision expressed by normative trade theory, all there is to know about 
welfare is the individual satisfaction of preferences. Later, I will revisit the two different criteria for 
efficiency that are commonly used to judge the satisfaction of preferences in society: Pareto efficiency 
(for which distribution of real income is to some extent irrelevant) and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (which 
is ultimately evaluated through a hypothetical cost-benefit analysis of willingness and ability to pay). 
Both rely on the preference satisfaction theory, of which Broome said that it is an “ethical theory, like 
any other theory of wellbeing” (p. 3). Preference satisfaction theory may be an ethical theory in that it 
makes a claim about what is good for individuals. Yet it also expresses views on political philosophy 
when it is endorsed alongside a strong commitment to efficiency at a societal level. Certain social and 
political institutions are endorsed over others, and principles for adjudicating desirable and undesirable 
institutions are implicit in the exposition. 
 
2.2 The Role of Welfare as Preference Satisfaction 
Textbooks vary with respect to how much they explore the economic welfare foundations of their 
policy recommendations. Sometimes, citations of the welfare economics literature are given, but 
seldom is it argued that the welfare economic foundations can be and have been subject to 
philosophical debate.14 Normative trade theory is built upon a very specific theory of wellbeing as 
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 In a survey of principles of economics textbooks, Hoaas (1993) finds that the scarcity definition of economics in fact only 
enters the mainstream in the 1940s. The first textbook employing the scarcity definition was Bowman and Bach (1943), 
claiming that the “central economic problem of any society” is the problem of “economizing scarce resources in order to 
produce the various good ultimately desired by consumers.” (p. 11) (as cited in Hoaas). 
14
 Arrow, Sen & Suzumura (2002) argue in their “Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare” that the debate on the theoretical 
foundations of welfare economics is inconclusive. Social choice theory itself is already “deeply rooted in the 
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well as a specific view of social aggregation.15 This is apparent if one analyses the reasons why 
politicians should follow policy recommendations drawn from the cost-benefit analysis explained 
above. Welfare, in the neoclassical argument, is defined only and exclusively as the satisfaction of 
preferences. Conventional welfare economics regards an economic state of affairs as desirable only 
insofar as it contributes to the satisfaction of preferences. Income, then, is used as a proxy for the 
possibility of attaining preference-satisfaction. The strong link between preference satisfaction, 
efficiency, and desirability is merely brushed over in textbooks.16 
One central charge I am making against normative trade theory as presented in mainstream 
textbooks is that it does not ask what economic welfare actually is, and why trade policy makers ought 
to act upon one specific (normative, historically contingent) conception of economic welfare rather 
than another. The welfare economic foundations are often hastily described, as in, for example, one of 
the field’s foundational texts, where it is noted that the analysis of wealth and welfare is 
“individualistic in the sense that national welfare depends, in some sense, on individual utilities” 
(Corden, 1984, p. 66, my emphasis). While many microeconomics textbooks (such as Gravelle & 
Rees, 2004) do mention the welfare assumptions upon which microeconomic models are built, there 
is, to my knowledge, no trade textbook in which academic debates in social choice theory (or other 
normative fields) are discussed directly. Representative of this simplistic approach is this quote from 
Zis (1990): “[…] economic theory does not, by definition, provide a guide to a fair distribution of 
resources” (p. 276). In this sense, the mainstream account ignores its substantive normative premises, 
motivation and history. 
 
2.3. Comparative Advantage – the Crucial Concept 
The principle of comparative advantage is the centrepiece of support for free trade in international 
trade textbooks and is always referred to in public interventions by international economists. Indeed it 
has been called the “essential theoretical case for free trade” (Bhagwati, 1996, p. 231). Paul 
Samuelson was once asked by mathematician Stanislaw Ulam to name one proposition in the social 
sciences that was both true and non-trivial. Samuelson (1969) responded by citing the principle of 
comparative advantage:  
 
That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; that it is not trivial is attested 
by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine 
for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them (p. 1). 
 
(Contd.)                                                                  
philosophical approach of welfarist-consequentialism in that [it is] based on the assessment of the goodness of states of 
affairs in terms of individual utilities obtained from these states of affairs” (Suzumura in Arrow et al, p. 23). Even the 
more specialized debate is held captive by a specific ethical outlook on economics.  
15
 With this I mean the understanding of how individuals make up society (individual welfare is readily combined to equal 
social welfare). Driskill (2012) notes that neoclassical economists make these normative claims more often and more 
persistently than economists in other sub-disciplines, such as for instance in social policy. As an example, see Grubel 
(1981), who says that “we can interpret any move to a higher community indifference curve as an unambiguous gain in 
welfare” (p. 37). 
16
 It bears repeating that the contemporary understanding of welfare-purely-as-preference-satisfaction is a historical oddity. 
The historical neoclassical economists are on this account much less dogmatic than their contemporary neoclassical 
interpreters since Hicks. The story that is underappreciated is the following: today’s economists – who are called and call 
themselves neoclassical – have rhetorically eliminated the normative aspects of their forbearers in order to construct a 
foundation myth of a context-free discipline. Contrary to this, Alfred Marshall himself argued that utility – understood as 
want satisfaction – is only part of economics, and that the more important feature of the economy is to contribute to what 
he calls individual character formation. Leon Walras, the founder of general equilibrium theory, endorsed free markets 
due to a conception of commutative justice. The idea that market transactions lead to desirable social outcomes was prior 
to the formal analysis. Most strikingly, it was John Bates Clark who provided a theory of marginal productivity that is 
both descriptive and normative: Clark says that it is just that individual marginal contribution determines wages and 
openly puts forward a theory of just market deserts. Normative concerns pervade economic doctrines. Today’s 
neoclassicals pretend this isn‘t so. 
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Here we have two aspects of the principle of comparative advantage that I want to highlight in the 
following sections. The first is the rhetoric employed. The principle is a matter of truth (“logically 
true”) that can be “grasped”. The second is the question of the advocated scope of its applicability. 
Arguably, what intelligent critics of the principle put forward is not a critique of the logical 
consistency of the doctrine, but rather scepticism about whether this simple model should be grounds 
for free trade, or whether it leaves out or misrepresents relevant facts about socio-economic life and 
under which conditions strict adherence to it may be unjust. 
Textbooks today present a linear narrative of the development of the principle of comparative 
advantage. They reduce Adam Smith’s panoptic study of international trade to an allegedly erroneous 
case for free trade based on “absolute advantage” (Maneschi, 1998; Schumacher, 2012).17 This is the 
explanation of the causes of and gains from international trade based on the fact of one country being 
absolutely more productive in the creation of one good as compared to another country’s productivity. 
The narrative then finds its conclusion and solution with David Ricardo, who is mentioned as the 
saviour of the principle, rectifying and formalizing the doctrine and establishing the case for free trade. 
With Ricardo, what is stressed is not absolute productivity advantage, but relative productivity 
advantage. The principle states that differences in national productivity give rise to gains from trade 
for all nations that liberalize. A nation need not be absolutely more productive in one good but only 
relatively so. Hence, every nation has a comparative advantage by definition. Any trade between two 
nations is preferable to autarky.  
Just by virtue of being different, every country has a comparative advantage. By definition, 
trade is beneficial. This is the response to the mercantilist: international trade is not a zero-sum game, 
it’s a variable sum undertaking – everyone may be a winner. In textbooks, gains from trade are 
obtained by managing opportunity costs. A nation wants to export goods and services it can produce at 
low opportunity cost, and import what it produces at high opportunity cost. Comparative advantage is 
powerful, because as long as there is at least one partner and two different goods or activities there is – 
whether in international trade or personal affairs – a comparative advantage in the production of one 
good or the pursuit of one activity. This represents a view of the world that focuses on the 
management of opportunity costs as the quintessential normative principle of economic policy. 
Models of trade are of course described in a more complex fashion in textbooks, but central policy 
justifications are essentially derived from David Ricardo‘s basic idea. For example, factor-proportions 
models such as Heckscher-Ohlin argue that gains are to be found in the relative difference of 
endowments. Textbooks may present many different theories of the causes of trade and the gains from 
trade – but when it comes to policy recommendations, it is always Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
model that is invoked.18 
The result that any trade is better than no trade aligns well with views that endorse institutions 
that allow or even promote voluntary exchanges.19 Voluntary economic transactions would not take 
                                                     
17
 Even John R. Hicks (1975) noted that Adam Smith’s dynamic conception of wealth is lost on his followers (p. 312). 
Grubel (1981) is an example for (mis)representing classical economists in the light of the neoclassical vision: Citing 
Smith and Ricardo’s analyses of competition he says that “the baker who tries to earn a profit [will bake at the cheapest 
price possible] the quality product the public wants at the cheapest price possible, in competition with other bakers”. 
International economics is apparently about how “selfish pursuit of the profit motive by international traders buying at 
low and selling at high prices increases world welfare” (p. 12). Insights about trade are placed in a linear tradition 
stemming from Smith to Ricardo and are presented within a normative framework in which selfish pursuit of economic 
action benefits society as a whole. 
18
 I am leaving out here increasing returns models of international trade, which commonly have fewer distributional 
consequences (Krugman, 2007; Pugel 2007). Increasing returns models argue that intra-industry trade is caused by 
economies of scale – inconsistent with the assumption of perfect competition in conventional comparative advantage 
models (e.g. the work of Helpman, 1981 & Dixit-Norman, 1980). If trade is based on increasing returns, then trade policy 
in fact does not have to deal with (as many) conflicts of interests. Trade policy would be a rare field of pure Pareto 
improvements and trade liberalization easy to justify. 
19
 Von Mises and Rothbard and their praxeological theories, for example, regard human actions as prima facie purposeful and 
rational. Acting means striving to exchange a worse state of affairs for a better one. This gives action itself a 
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place unless both parties are better off by making these exchanges than by not making them. The fact 
that, by focusing on relative advantage in productivity, every nation has a comparative advantage by 
definition yields astounding conclusions. Most crucially, individual losers from economic activity do 
not exist. The core of the essential theoretical case for free trade operates at the level of the nation. In 
this and in many other respects, Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage can be regarded as the 
Archimedean point of microeconomic trade policy thinking. 20 
Let us investigate some of the core premises of the principle and the way it is explained in 
textbooks. Usually, the Ricardian model is explained using a 2x2 analysis (consisting of two goods 
and two countries), where labour is held to be perfectly mobile and where a presumption of constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition obtains. 21 For Bhagwati, comparative advantage is “a highly 
simplified model which was intended to be, and served as, an eminently successful instrument for 
demonstrating the welfare proposition that trade is beneficial” rather than “a serious attempt at 
isolating the crucial variables which can be used to ‘explain’ the pattern of trade” (Bhagwati, 1964, p. 
4, as cited in Gandolfo, 1994, p. 23). 
 
2.4. An Efficiency Criterion to Suit the Vision 
Contemporary economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends, is – 
in this neoclassical definition at least – about efficiency. In particular, it is the concept of Pareto 
efficiency that is central to contemporary welfare economics. A point is Pareto-efficient when it is 
impossible to make one person better off without simultaneously making another person worse off. 
Pareto-inefficiency requires that there is “an unexploited possibility of an unambiguous welfare 
improvement” (Corden, 1984, p. 67). The literature on social choice theory has shown, however, that 
there is more than just one definition of efficiency. The choice of one efficiency criterion over another 
is a non-neutral choice that might not only contradict certain moral theories (Sen, 1970) but is also 
indicative of an underlying stance on distributive justice specifically, and political philosophy more 
generally. This claim can be corroborated by Buchanan (1984), for whom 
 
the rather unreflective popularity of the Paretian concept of efficiency is due either to the failure of 
its adherents to recognize that the Principle of Utility, for which they view the Paretian Principles 
as a substitute, is not morally neutral, or to their tacit skepticism about the possibility of gaining a 
consensus on moral theory, or to the mistaken belief that morality and efficiency cannot conflict, 
or to the equally mistaken belief that the Paretian principles are principles of rationality [...or…] 
they assume that Utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. But this assumption […] is also 
dubious (p. 13). 
 
There has been a significant development in economic trade theory in the last century. Free trade has 
always been regarded as economically efficient, but the efficiency criterion invoked has changed. This 
has happened within the core of microeconomic trade theory – i.e. within the models of comparative 
advantage surveyed above. Textbooks of international trade usually present the reader with the 
development of these trade models: from Smith to Ricardo, then to Heckscher-Ohlin and to modern 
trade theories. In Ricardian trade theory, trade is Pareto efficient at the level of the nation state (every 
(Contd.)                                                                  
deontological quality: actions are intrinsically good, or at least aimed at betterment. To praxeologists, the social world 
can be entirely explained by, and reduced to, actions. Increased choice is always desirable by definition. 
20
 Even this simplest 2x2 model of two goods and two countries might not be historically true to Ricardo, as Maneschi (2008) 
argues, stressing that Ricardo would talk about increasing profit rates from trade as additional welfare benefits accrue 
dynamically. What is presented as the static case by textbooks today was itself really a dynamic one. Due to 
methodological strictures, even good arguments in favour of free trade fall by the wayside. 
21
 Even for the simple Ricardian analysis, astounding simplifications need to be made in order to make the model work. Even 
the simplest change to the premises has an impact on the welfare effects of trade. Of course, the international trade theory 
literature has studied the effects of partial relaxation of all these factors for trade. Economists are well aware of this, as 
Krugman notes: “[E]conomists are familiar with a number of reasons why the gains from free trade may not work out 
quite as easily as in the simplest Ricardian model. External economies may mean underinvestment in import-competing 
sectors; imperfect competition may lead to a strategic competition over industry rents; because of distortions in domestic 
labour markets, imports may reduce wages or cause unemployment; and so on” (Krugman, 1998, p. 2).  
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country gains from trade liberalization). In Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and in the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem in particular, this is not the case anymore. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
analyzes the effect of relative price changes of goods in the world economy due to trade and their 
effects on factor remuneration (e.g. wages).22 Here, there are distributive effects within the country, as 
factors of production are assumed to be partially immobile. Trade occurs as countries attempt to 
specialize. This means that the composition of national output changes, entailing that labour moves 
from less lucrative occupations in one industry to more lucrative ones. If trade occurs, those groups 
that are not involved in producing the good that the country specializes in may lose out absolutely (not 
only relatively). Yet, winners from trade in Heckscher-Ohlin models could compensate the losers 
within a country, making everyone hypothetically better off.23 This means that free trade is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient – but not Pareto efficient. By allowing for the possibility of incomplete factor mobility 
(i.e. labour not being able to move from one industry to another without friction), there are losers from 
trade. 
The move from Ricardo to Heckscher-Ohlin is a normative “game-changer”, even though the 
label “efficient” is used for both of them. It leads supporters of trade liberalization to make a wholly 
different moral argument in the face of the distributive effects of trade liberalization.24 This change of 
the efficiency criterion for evaluating trade, however, is conveniently glossed over in the textbooks, 
and only peripherally mentioned. Some critics have pointed out the controversial implicit normative 
commitments that neoclassical theory supports when endorsing Kaldor-Hicks as an efficiency 
criterion.25 Endorsing Kaldor-Hicks expresses views about what counts as permissible and 
compensable economic harm brought about by economic policy (DeMartino, 2014). More broadly, an 
endorsement of Kaldor-Hicks implies a philosophical stance on how to treat those disadvantaged by 
trade liberalization and, fundamentally, what individuals deserve to receive in a market economy. This 
view is corroborated by looking back at the original articles by Kaldor and Hicks. 
In 1941, John R. Hicks devised the criterion as 
 
a perfectly objective test which enables us to discriminate between those reorganisations which 
improve productive efficiency and those which do not. If A is made so much better off by the 
change that he could compensate B for his loss, and still have something left over, then the 
reorganisation is an unequivocal improvement (p. 111, my emphasis). 
                                                     
22
 Traditionally, it has been assumed in works of international economics that all factors of production are perfectly mobile in 
the long term. When trade liberalization leads to a convergence of relative prices across nations, in the long term factors 
will adapt to new economic conditions. Scholars of the political economy of trade have been rather more interested in the 
short run, however, inquiring into the kinds of political divisions that are to be expected with regard to trade policy 
depending on degrees of factor mobility in the domestic economy (e.g. Rogowski, 1989). 
23
 Practical problems with achieving these actual Pareto improvements include: the (political) cost of maintaining 
programmes of compensation and the identification of who precisely is affected. Autarky, in the case that no lump-sum 
compensation is feasible, might be preferable to free international markets (Rodrik, 1997; Brecher & Choudhri, 1994). 
24
 It is not claimed here that losers from liberalization generally have a claim to compensation. A normative countervision 
would need to specify under which condition individuals are disadvantaged from trade liberalization in order to state 
what expectations of socio-economic share outs they may legitimately have. This article proceeds without such a 
specification. For now, it may suffice to note that textbooks make normative arguments about the legitimacy of the 
claims of very different types of losers (e.g. those who are relative/absolute losers compared with the gains of their peers 
in a competitive market economy vs. those who lose out from a one-off policy change vs. those who are losers compared 
to living in a different counterfactual policy regime). Even without such a specification, attention to “losers from trade” 
may be warranted because of a general concern with the worst-off in any economy. This concern might be even more 
relevant if it were found that losing in the economy, as is likely, is serially correlated (DeMartino, 2014). 
25
 Kaldor and Hicks wanted to retain the ability of economics to judge policy changes and call them efficient. For this, they 
devised a “compensation test” that claimed that an economic policy change may be efficient if it is possible that the 
winners could potentially compensate the losers. This criterion is much less strict than Pareto: But the justification for 
why a change is efficient has changed. Now, a policy, for example trade liberalization, can be “efficient” – based on the 
potential compensation of losers from trade alone (only comparing the willingness-to-pay of losers and winners in terms 
of monetary values.) 
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That Hicks called this test objective should astound us. Hicks wanted to retain the ability of economics 
to judge policy changes and call them efficient. Going back to the original formulations of the 
criterion, it is remarkable to see that the test should apply for policy changes (e.g. trade liberalization), 
but also that the purpose of economic policy in general is to perform these changes. The case for free 
trade becomes the case for trade liberalization. 
Sometimes, the recommendations on how to treat the distributive effects of trade rely on what 
Corden (1984) once called a Hicksian optimism. The argument can be summarized in the following 
recommendation: ‘Just allow trade liberalization, worry about redistribution later (if at all). Think 
about net gains for the economy and not individual entities. At some point, even the losers will be 
better off!’.  
Winters (1985) acknowledges in his textbook the costs of liberalization:  
 
The success of trade liberalization depends on resources being able to move between industries 
according to comparative advantage, and this requires both mobility and wage flexibility [...] This 
does not weaken the long-run case for freer trade, [...] it merely recognizes that adjustment costs 
can be high and that choosing the ‘right’ time for adjustment can be beneficial (p. 109). 
 
Over time, short-term losers will supposedly be long-term beneficiaries from trade – as if individuals 
lived forever, eternally moving from contracting to expanding industries. And the bigger the economic 
entity we are looking at, the easier it becomes to see the overall net gains that outweigh individual 
losses. However, the terms of the debate have changed – instead of unambiguous national welfare 
gains, trade theory now only considers national net welfare gains when endorsing Kaldor-Hicks 
criteria. Much of the libertarian trickle-down optimism derives from stipulations by Kuznets (1955) 
that inequality is only a temporary phenomenon in the process of development – a similar premise can 
be seen in the neoclassical vision. Often, the non sequitur is drawn from this that inequality problems 
simply solve themselves without any government intervention.  
On Hicksian optimism, Samuelson is cited (in Kiesling, 1992): 
 
Even if for each single change it is hard to know in advance who will be helped and who will be 
hurt, in the absence of known ‘bias’ in the whole sequence of changes, there is some vague 
presumption that a hazy version of the law of large numbers will obtain: so as the number of 
quasi-independent events becomes larger and larger, the chances improve that any random person 
will be on balance benefited by a social compact that lets events take place that push out society’s 
utility possibility frontier, even though any one of the events may push some people along the new 
frontier in a direction less favorable than the status quo (p. 23). 
 
Samuelson meant to describe the situation in the 1930s, but the time-bound optimism he displayed still 
reigns over neoclassical economics today. What commitments are made with this Hicksian optimism?  
In his authoritative handbook on normative trade theory, Corden (1984) says that “[t]he usual 
approach in normative trade theory” is simply (1) to assume that redistribution does take place – i.e. 
that there is an independent income distribution policy which achieves the appropriate or best 
distribution [...], and (2) to use the Pareto-efficiency criterion (p. 66). Furthermore, he claims that “if 
Pareto-efficient policies […] are being pursued consistently over a long period, the chances are that 
eventually – though not at every particular step – everyone will be better off” (p. 68). Corden, implies 
here that redistribution is not necessary, because in the end it all evens out – we simply do not have to 
worry about policies of redistribution. Corden then introduces trade models with distributive effects 
and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for efficiency is automatically adopted.26 Potential (and not actual) 
                                                     
26
 A crude representation of this is if person A is given $3000 while someone takes away $1000 from person B, then social 
welfare has increased by $2000. It does not require much to see that B may feel unfairly treated. Yet this is an efficient 
reallocation of resources under the provision that it enables the gainers to net-compensate the losers, whether or not they 
then actually do so. 
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compensation is hence the foundation for justifying trade policy. This is pure optimism. The case for 
choosing one efficiency criterion over the other is insufficiently argued.  
A free trade policy, compared to a policy of autarky or restricted trade, does in fact satisfy the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion – but it only does this in a hypothetical, not an actual way. In the textbooks, 
this Hicksian optimism is adopted without ever clarifying this assumption. Krugman and Obstfeld 
(2009) in their textbook argue that we ought to ask the following question: “Could those who gain 
from trade compensate those who lose, and still be better off themselves?” They argue that “[if this is] 
so, then trade is a source of potential gain for everyone” (p. 72). Yet I have not seen a single textbook 
in which there is an actual attempt to see whether the losers are actually compensated or not – and 
whether and in what way this undermines the case for free trade. Since Hicks, this argument has 
sometimes been referred to as the compensationist argument. 
Mandler (1999) says:  
 
In the compensationist vision, economic science should bracket ethical questions and rank 
economic arrangements solely on the basis of their efficiency. Politicians and philosophers, in 
their corner, would debate the principles of distributive justice and decide which of the most 
efficient allocations should be instituted (p. 141). 
 
Yet, in a textbook, Grubel (1981) writes that “[w]e adopted the assumption that political bargaining 
processes work sufficiently well to ensure that the interests of losers are protected and policies are 
undertaken only if gainers are made better off after they have compensated the losers” (p. 38). 
Political bargaining processes are assumed to work things out in the end. Other textbooks advise 
against actual compensation schemes (even though endorsing Kaldor-Hicks) because “economic 
progress could easily end up snarled in red tape” (Krugman and Obstfeld, as quoted in Driskill, 2012, 
p.11). The only textbook that does not conform to this is Pugel (2007):  
 
Because the capital losses of owners and workers in these situations are caused by deliberate and 
unavoidable government actions, in the name of overall public welfare economists believe that it is 
appropriate that the general public, through the government, pay compensation to those who lose 
from the tariff reduction (p. 174).  
 
Pugel talks about adjustment programmes as “useful,” and urges “compassion for the workers who 
lose their jobs in the process” (ibid.) 
One rare and early critique has been put forward by Hahn (1998). He argues that the old 
political economy mantra is true: the reason for most political economy opposition against free trade is 
that economic losses are concentrated and gains are dispersed. But he says that it is also true that there 
are significant losses that are dispersed, which are subtle and hard to quantify, such as greater job 
insecurity and income risks (when labour transitions to comparative advantage) which are difficult to 
insure against. He concludes that free trade requires redistribution in the classic case. First, there is a 
need to “identify[...] the losers, whether of the temporary or permanent kind”. This “is a first step to 
reducing their losses” (p. 21). 
Claiming that free trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (with imperfect labour mobility) is still 
efficient is a normative argument contributing to debates about compensation and redistribution in 
society. In most textbooks, this is not regarded as an issue worthy of further justification – the debate 
usually stops at outlining the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency.27 The problem is that Kaldor-Hicks 
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 Rider (1982) argues that trade theorists defend free trade policy religiously: “Although usually presented as a conclusion 
deriving from the analysis, it is in fact the frame of reference for international trade theory. That is, it is the “ideal” and 
any deviations are regarded as inefficient. This value judgment hamstrings any practical policy advice: the only 
recommendation compatible with this assumption is a policy of inaction, and to leave the market to get on with it” (p. 
595) 
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separates the evaluation of efficiency from the actually performed redistribution and compensation 
taking place.28  
 
3.1 Do As I Told You – Normativity and Policy Recommendations 
In his best-selling “Principles of Economics” textbook, Mankiw (2007) writes that the concept of 
efficiency is neutral. This is the mainstream view on the issue, also in trade theory: “Whereas 
efficiency is an objective goal that can be judged on strictly positive grounds, equity involves 
normative judgments that go beyond economics and enter into the realm of political philosophy” (p. 
148, my emphasis).29 Yet Pareto efficiency is not neutral, but a normative criterion, particularly when 
it is linked to policy recommendations (and not just presented as an ‘aesthetic concept’ which the 
economist studies due to its intrinsic significance). The judgment that we ought to have a Pareto 
efficient distribution is value laden. Mongin (2006) argues similarly when claiming that efficiency in 
economics today is an evaluative concept, and that evaluative concepts ‘trigger’ prescriptions. 
Claiming that x is a good policy necessitates that policy x ought to be undertaken and that another 
policy y, which does not live up to the standard of policy x, ought not to be undertaken. Mongin roots 
this argument in a meta-ethical view by “Husserl, Hare and many others, that [...] I cannot declare an 
action X to be morally best without implying that one should do X under the proviso that X is 
feasible” (p. 11). Saying, as normative trade theorists do, that policy x is better than policy y entails 
prescription, which is normative. Mongin, felicitously, sums this view up in the phrase: “Evaluations 
semantically entail prescriptions” (p. 12).30 
But, granted that Pareto is not neutral, is Pareto efficiency a good normative standard? Pareto 
efficiency alone is a poor normative standard for evaluating economic policy for two main reasons. 
First, Pareto efficiency may be too imprecise to be relevant for economic policy because there are too 
many conceivable Pareto efficient states of affairs. Distributions can be crassly unequal, yet satisfy the 
Pareto criterion. Second, Pareto inefficient situations may be morally preferable to efficient ones: 
slavery may be economically efficient, yet immoral. Sen (1987) stressed the limited way in which 
Pareto efficiency is a criterion for assessing social achievement (p. 33). 
While Pareto efficiency by itself is a poor criterion, something may be said for Pareto 
efficiency to be a consideration in giving policy advice. A Pareto efficient distribution is attractive to 
economists because it takes seriously the preferences of individuals as voiced by themselves. 
Hennipman (1992) calls it the “naturally enticing and well-defined objective” (p. 435). It allegedly 
does not require any imputation of preferences on the group but takes just those orderings that 
individuals give the economist.31 Pareto as a criterion for “assessing social achievements” is then 
attractive because, allegedly, it only derives from the subjective preferences of individual economic 
agents and does not require an omniscient social planner. Another reason why Pareto might be, at first 
sight, a very attractive way of assessing social achievements, is due to its limited aspirations. Pareto 
does not judge the desirability of one state of affairs against all other counterfactual and imaginable 
states of affairs but rather takes existing distributions as given. This means that it is a standard that is 
                                                     
28
 How is a defence of free trade compatible with the possibility of individual human beings losing out? Unfortunately, this 
dilemma has not been reflected in the intellectual history of trade. Seminal works by Viner (1991), Irwin (1996), Sally 
(1998) and Lal (2006), while thorough on the economic history of distributive effects, do not inquire into the conditions 
under which distributive effects resulting from trade may be morally problematic, particularly for liberal political 
philosophy. Too often, resistance to free trade arguments on moral grounds is mistaken for naïve protectionism. Too 
easily, economic liberalism is equated with political liberalism. 
29
 In the 6th edition of 2012, however, this and some similar passages are missing. It is now granted that economics alone 
“cannot determine the best way to balance the goals of efficiency and equity. This issue involves political philosophy as 
well as economics.” (p. 252). See also Mankiw (2014). 
30
 Mongin makes his point concerning an investigation of “poverty”, but his analysis also applies to the topics of interest 
here. 
31
 Of course, this is not strictly true as seen from my discussion on the theory of preference satisfaction: the ordering is given 
according to the principle of the agents’ rationality, which is itself an assumption that is imputed on ideal economic 
agents by the neoclassical economists! 
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applicable ‘here and now’. If we have to fundamentally quarrel with the current distribution, this 
limited view of what social improvements would mean is attractive precisely due to its partial ranking 
of alternatives. 
Here, I do not wish to go too deeply into the question of whether economics is or can be a 
value-free science. The view of a value-free economics is often formulated by those authors who 
separate economics into its positive and normative branches (which is true for all trade theorists).32 For 
Winters (1985), for instance, “The former deals with how the world is, the latter with how it ought to 
be.” (p. 5). Other textbook authors argue that although “these aspects are strictly intertwined in our 
discipline, they are usually presented separately for didactic convenience” (Gandolfo, 1994, p. 4). 
Here, I do not attempt to answer the question whether value judgments can be part of the discipline of 
economics, or whether positive and normative approaches are reconcilable. These are questions that 
others have dealt with, for instance accounts that attempt to “reform” economics from within, arguing 
that economic science can incorporate values (Sen, 1977; 1987). Rather, I argue that normative trade 
theory, in its current form, has such a strong underlying normative vision and that it is important to 
make the normative assumptions underlying the vision explicit.33 
Pareto efficiency, as Blaug (1987) notes, involves ethical considerations and is normative in 
the sense of offering statements of desirable states of affairs via persuasion. Blaug highlights three 
ways in which he sees Pareto optimality as relying on “judgments of values.” These are: first, the 
assumption that every individual is the best judge of his own welfare (consumer sovereignty); second, 
the view that social welfare is defined only in terms of the welfare of individuals (individualism in 
social choice); and third, the view that the welfare of individuals may not be compared (unanimity) (p. 
626). 
Blaug (1995) argues that, together with the endorsement of the fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics, new welfare economists regarded “efficiency” as value-neutral, and “equity” as 
value-laden (pp. 636). For him, the terms “efficient” and “inefficient” are normative and could not be 
separated from value judgment. Hennipman (1992) disputes that welfare economics favours efficiency 
over other social objectives. In replying to Blaug, he maintains that economists do not attach ethical 
meaning to efficiency. Hennipman argues that this would be “dangerous”, because 
 
while one may regard efficiency in many cases as meritorious, it is not always true that efficiency 
is ‘more desirable’ than inefficiency. In general its moral value obviously depends on the ends, 
means and ways of action. One may very well prefer an inefficient to an efficient Gestapo. (p. 422) 
 
For Hennipman, Paretian welfare economics is scientific and positive. But I would argue against this 
that it is precisely welfare economics that knows no deontology, that the neoclassical vision is 
completely blind to the morality (the content) of agents’ preferences. It is exactly this unencumbered 
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 See for instance the comprehensive debate in Putnam & Walsh (2011, pp. 230) in which the positive/normative dichotomy 
is challenged, arguing that facts and values are always entangled in more complicated ways than mainstream economics 
pretends. For Putnam and Walsh, factual inquiry cannot isolate itself from moral reasoning (and vice-versa). See also 
critics of purely positive economics: Walsh (1987, 1994, 1996, 2000). To those economists who believe that economics 
is devoid of ethics, Broome (forthcoming) replies that while macroeconomics may rightfully claim this to some extent (it 
deals with broad aggregates, eliding conflicting interests), microeconomics functions against a background of conflicting 
interests between different agents in the economy. Broome argues that due to this conflict of interest, value judgements 
must necessarily be undertaken between different individuals such that normative statements in microeconomics are 
ethical. Even more important, I would argue, is a statement by Mongin that clarifies the evaluative character of 
economics in a magisterial way. Mongin writes, asking whether predicates of economics are evaluative or not, that there 
are clear occurrences of the ‘evaluative good’ in economics. Yet, Mongin does not agree that economists talk about the 
same things as ethicists, saying that “economists concentrate on just a few aspects of what is good or bad in a thing or a 
state of affairs. They typically indicate the restriction by saying “economic such-and-such” (in early welfare economics) 
or “social such-and-such” (in social choice theory and later welfare economics)” (p. 13). I argue that in trade theory 
economists do not precisely restrict their ambitions in such a way. 
33
 This may proceed without presenting a normative countervision that could guide economic policy considerations more 
generally. I believe that a Rawlsian account of markets poses the best answer to the failings of the neoclassical vision 
described here. 
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approach to policy recommendations that allows efficiency to be prioritized over other social ends that 
are equally or more meritorious. Not only is efficiency all that is ever talked about; as will be seen 
later, textbook accounts moralize efficiency. And when Kaldor-Hicks is added to this, economists start 
to compare winners and losers and justify policy by net gains, thereby making decisions about the 
kind of society we should live in.34 
Whether or not we agree with Blaug (that Pareto efficiency relies on value judgments) or with 
Hennipman (that welfare can be studied by positive sciences), the relevant test is arguably what 
economists actually do with their analysis. The minute efficiency analysis is the source of policy 
recommendations is the minute a specific view on justice is endorsed. This view must be made 
explicit. All textbooks engage in policy recommendations, some with more radical free trade agendas 
than others. This is the core of normative trade theory and not just a disinterested scientific debate 
open to different conclusions. Briefly stressing another historical continuity, I want to highlight a 
quote from Scitovsky (an ordinalist working on the new welfare economics), who is quoted in the 
“Critique of Welfare Economics” by Little (1957):  
 
[I]t is not enough to declare the desirability of free trade and trust that enlightenment will bring it 
about; nor is it enough to create initial conditions favorable to it; it must be imposed and enforced 
[...] We [economists] can only tell that some form of compulsion is necessary to ensure free trade 
(Scitovsky, as quoted in Little, p. 255, my emphasis).35 
 
Normative trade theory itself remains undecided about its normativity in the rare cases these questions 
are addressed. Mankiw (2008a), for instance, has recently publicly declared in a dispute on his blog 
that:  
 
Any normative statement goes beyond sheer economics and involves a degree of political 
philosophy. Economists' devotion to free trade is based not only on the positive conclusion that it 
leads to a bigger economic pie but also on a couple of related philosophical positions. (p. 2) 
 
 Yet, only three paragraphs later, Mankiw again puts forward a claim for the value-neutrality of 
economics: “The fact that some people lose when trade is opened up has no philosophical 
significance. (Whether it has political significance is another matter)”.36 This shows the paradoxical 
nature of the status of efficiency in trade theory.37  
To sum up: the choice of efficiency introduces exactly the kind of normative argument into 
the debate that normative trade theorists profess to exclude. Whether on purpose or not, trade theorists 
commit to value judgments when they address the problem of efficiency while talking about policy. 
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 Blaug (1993) argues: “To call Paretian welfare economics positive economics suggests that ethics, morality and philosophy 
have nothing whatever to do with an economist's pronouncements in favour of, say, competition and free trade. 
Economics is a science and stands alone without assistance from these other disciplines. Such arrogance has long kept 
economics divorced from sociology and politics, not to mention law and public administration. Economics is in good part 
a policy science and a policy science which professes to reach significant conclusions about policy issues without ever 
invoking a single value judgment practicing deception.” (pp. 128-9). I argue that by engaging in policy, economic theory 
turns into political philosophy – which is precisely what occurs in the textbooks. 
35
 Little’s critique used the approach that logical positivists use to argue that welfare economics cannot possibly arrive at 
objective criteria for just economic states of affairs. Yet his critique is too tame, as he merely provides a light critique of 
the language and emotive nature of the arguments brought forward. 
36
 Note that the author of the best-selling and most-read textbook in economics today has been writing on matters of political 
philosophy. See Mankiw (2010), where a normative theory of just deserts is explicitly defended. Here, he writes that 
“[p]eople should get what they deserve. A person who contributes more to society deserves a higher income that reflects 
those greater contributions”. For Mankiw, inequality in an ideal capitalist society is efficient and therefore just. In 
another essay entitled “Defending the one percent”, Mankiw (2013) argues that redistribution means taking away the 
fruits of one‘s labour and is hence immoral. Again, he writes that earnings should correspond to marginal productivity 
and hence to social contribution. Nowhere does Mankiw argue that his philosophical views are related to the way he 
understands, and teaches, economics. 
37
 See Mankiw (2008a and 2008b).  
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Arguing in favour of a specific interpretation of efficiency means favouring efficiency at the expense 
of other social values. 
 
3.2 Let Me Tell You What is Fair – Autarky as Moral Baseline 
Unconditional adherence to the principle of comparative advantage as the basis for policy 
recommendations raises several issues of justice (Gonzalez, 2006). For example, it may create 
perverse incentives for countries in their decisions on how to structure their economies. Given that it is 
most profitable when specializing in the kind of economic activity that is cheapest relative to world 
market prices, poorer countries might opt to use their ‘comparative advantage in wrong-doing’ to 
exploit these distinct gains. Poorer countries might use their ‘advantage’ in being able to keep labour 
costs low (through sweatshops, outlawing of unionized labour or forced prison labour), lack of 
environmental regulations, or lack of democratic governance (corruption) to bring products to the 
world market. Comparative advantage theory does not discriminate among legitimate and illegitimate 
sources of comparative advantage, and, technically, there is no difference if the principle of 
comparative advantage is presented with cloth and wine (as Ricardo did) or with hand guns and exotic 
animal parts. Normative trade theory does not provide criteria for goods that ought to be included in 
the market and those that should be excluded. 
Yet neoclassical visionaries, when pressed, do offer a view on what they regard as legitimate 
or not. Trade theorists such as Bhagwati (1995) regard differing social and environmental standards as 
priorities that nations have chosen voluntarily as legitimate objectives of their economic policy. Most 
of the time, theorists regard restrictions on trade as outcomes of rent-seeking and selfish lobbying by 
special interest groups. Social and environmental concerns are rarely taken seriously, but denigrated as 
“blue protectionism” (in the case of workers’ rights as justification for trade restrictions) or “green 
protectionism” (in the case of provisions designed to avoid damage to the environment) (p. 12). In the 
same paper, Bhagwati shows more ambiguity when treating the matter of child labour. Without 
specifying the conditions for the scope of legitimate comparative advantage, it seems arbitrary what is 
and what is not to be included in the comparative advantage of a country (for a critique, see Barry & 
Reddy, 2008).38 Yet even if neoclassical theorists do not engage in such radical justifications, they 
usually resort to the argumentation that “[a]s a general rule, whatever a tariff can do for the nation, 
something else can do better” (Pugel, 2006, Chp. 7). 
Often, the defence of comparative advantage without restrictions takes place in textbooks by 
means of providing case studies against what theorists call the pauper labour fallacy, most 
prominently argued in Krugman & Obstfeld (2006, Chapter 17, p. 7). The fallacy consists of the 
argument that we should not endorse trade with “seemingly ‘unfair’ competition from cheap foreign 
labour” (Grubel, 1981, p. 160). Krugman (1998) writes: 
 
This is the classic ‘pauper labor’ fallacy, the fallacy that Ricardo dealt with when he first stated the 
idea, and which is a staple of even first-year courses in economics. In fact, one never teaches the 
Ricardian model without emphasizing precisely the way that model refutes the claim that 
competition from low-wage countries is necessarily a bad thing, that it shows how trade can be 
mutually beneficial regardless of differences in wage rates. (p. 4) 
 
Of course, Krugman is right to portray trade as more than a zero-sum game and to argue that trade 
with low-wage countries is not necessarily a bad thing, and to say instead that trade is mutually 
beneficial irrespective of wage levels.39 It may even be a fallacy to argue that just because trade with 
low-wage countries has some bad effects, trade relations as a whole are bad. However, the problem is 
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 This has been pointed out, from different perspectives, in DeMartino (2002) and Kurjanska & Risse (2008). Risse, for 
instance, notices that it is morally dubious to accept whatever social costs of production give rise to a comparative 
advantage in the production of a foreign good. DeMartino (2002) similarly criticizes what he believes is an inherent 
moral relativism of comparative advantage thinking. 
39
 In an op-ed in 2007, Krugman contradicts his previous remarks, conceding that there may be some merit to the pauper 
labour fallacy after all.  
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that the pauper labour fallacy is only truly a fallacy if there is complete mobility of labour, the factor 
of production in question here. The model with which comparative advantage is defended by Krugman 
simply assumes perfect mobility within the domestic setting – people can and will costlessly move 
from contracting to expanding industries. But if they cannot – that is, in reality (and particularly the 
reality of poor countries) – then the fallacy is not a fallacy at all. Krugman puts forward his 
“debunking” of the supposed fallacy with such verve that it makes the audience forget the assumptions 
of the model. The oversight here is that just because trade is not necessarily detrimental, it needs to be 
universally endorsed as the relevant baseline is autarky. 
 
3.3 Denigrating Opposition in Public Debate 
In a 2008 New York Times op-ed, Greg Mankiw tried, in an ironic manner, to delegitimize arguments 
that challenge mainstream trade orthodoxy. Mankiw (2008a) compared trade economists with “mere 
Muggles” or Joe Sixpacks. In a similar vein, Krugman (2002) has suggested that intellectuals do not 
understand comparative advantage because they do not want to understand it. Krugman conjectures 
that it is just popular and avant-garde to criticize economists without fully grasping their arguments. In 
addition, Krugman suggests that critics have an aversion to modelling and oppose a mathematical 
view of the world. He claims that anti-free traders attack economists because it is “cool” and a “way to 
seem daring and unconventional” (p. 23). Critics hence attack economists just because free trade has 
an iconic status.40 Yet this polemic completely neglects three aspects. First, that lay-people in western 
economies show strong and significant resistance to laissez-faire policies of international trade. 
Second, that there are well-reasoned arguments against free trade. Third, that there may be well-
reasoned arguments in favour of free trade that do not rely on comparative advantage alone. 
Yet the polemic exemplified by Mankiw and Krugman does not only find its place in op-eds, 
it is prevalent in conference proceedings, articles and textbooks. Throughout the intellectual history of 
free trade, free traders from David Ricardo and J. S. Mill onwards have accused protectionists and 
trade-sceptics of being ignorant of the basic tenets of international economics. Of course, there are 
people who (sometimes wilfully) misconstrue economic trade theory. Yet it has become almost a rite 
of passage for international economists to ridicule lay-persons when it comes to scepticism concerning 
the principle of comparative advantage. Joe Sixpack is committing cognitive mistakes, which leads 
Krugman (2002) to use – as a sub-heading – the title “You just don’t understand” (p. 23), bemoaning a 
“sheer lack of comprehension” (p. 24). Krugman complains about the need to be “reduced nearly to 
babytalk” to bring across his ideas (p. 29). Similarly, he asks: 
 
Why do journalists who have a reputation as deep thinkers about world affairs begin squirming in 
their seats if you try to explain how trade can lead to mutually beneficial specialization? Why is it 
virtually impossible to get a discussion of comparative advantage, not only onto newspaper op-ed 
pages, but even into magazines that cheerfully publish long discussions of the work of Jacques 
Derrida? Why do policy wonks who will happily watch hundreds of hours of talking heads 
droning on about the global economy refuse to sit still for the ten minutes or so it takes to explain 
Ricardo? (p. 22). 
 
Krugman attempts to put forward an analogy between the doctrine of comparative advantage and the 
idea of evolution via natural selection, arguing that each idea is “simple and compelling to those who 
understand it, but about which intelligent people somehow manage to get confused time and time 
again” (p. 22). In what I take to be an appeal to an argument from authority, Krugman attempts to put 
Charles Darwin on an equal intellectual footing to neoclassical trade theorists: Darwin had an idea that 
was difficult to understand; and Ricardo also had an idea that not everyone could grasp. As a matter of 
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 It does not help that among the variables influencing trade preferences, it is often found that “economic education” has 
strong effects on preferences resisting liberalization (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006; Kemp, 2007; Caplan & Miller, 2010; 
Medrano & Braun, 2012; Ehrlich, Maestas, Hearn & Urbanski, 2010). Too often, the faulty conclusion is drawn that 
people who are not unequivocally enthusiastic about free trade are uneducated and intellectually inferior. In this regard, 
even parts of the political economy literature on trade preferences is not immune from the neoclassical vision: many 
articles assume that the desirability of free trade is a scientific fact that the uneducated simply do not ‘get’. 
Economists as Political Philosphers 
19 
fact, Krugman is drawing a parallel between biology as a science and economics as a science as well – 
whereby he might not only misrepresent economics but also evolutionary theory. Be that as it may, 
Krugman conflates the understanding of the concept of comparative advantage with endorsing such 
trade policy on the basis of the concept alone!41 
 
4.1 The Free Trade/Protectionism Dichotomy 
We have followed the neoclassical vision of trade in theory and rhetoric, particularly its endorsement 
of free markets. In the following, I will show how the neoclassical vision tries to uphold a dichotomy 
of either free trade or protectionism that is based on contestable assumptions. The argument will not 
exhaust all the good arguments in favour of free trade that exist, but will rather concern itself with the 
bad arguments in favour of free trade that are made in textbooks. A particular problem is that the 
definition of what counts as protectionism varies from a narrow account (sheltering domestic 
industries from world market prices through instruments such as tariffs or quotas) to a more 
permissive account (government market interventions more broadly understood).42 
It is common to all the textbooks surveyed that they go through the ‘best’ economic arguments 
for protectionism in a structured, dialectical fashion: a protectionist account is presented and refuted. 
A second protectionist account is presented and refuted. This maieutic method occurs in all the 
textbooks surveyed. Meanwhile, the case for free trade is strengthened, culminating in the conclusion 
that there is no “theoretically valid” and “pragmatically sound” case for protectionism. Examples of 
this approach can be found in all textbooks, for instance in Grubel (1981): “[...] most economists 
believe that all of these special circumstances have failed to destroy the general case for free trade we 
have just made” (p. 49). The “general case for free trade” is defended throughout. Textbooks often 
admit, however, that there are some theoretically valid arguments (mostly three) that favour curtailing 
trade under specific assumptions. Most often cited are the following three:  
 
1. Terms of trade arguments for protectionism. These arguments claim that a country – given that 
it is sufficiently big in one market – may influence relative world prices, and have, through this 
beggar-thy-neighbour policy, a welfare gain through a protectionist tariff (also called the optimum 
tariff).  
2. Infant industry arguments for protectionism. These arguments claim that it is possible for a 
country to selectively protect some industries in order to actively create a comparative advantage 
in them.  
3. Strategic trade arguments. These arguments claim that a country can in some cases strategically 
shield itself from world prices in order to win market shares vis-à-vis a competing nation in the 
same industry. 
 
Nearly all textbooks grant that, theoretically, these arguments are valid (Pugel, 2006, Chp. 7). But they 
also argue that they are unsound. Thus, textbooks in mainstream international economics arguably step 
out of their realm of expertise. In the case of all the arguments, epistemological reasons are cited for 
why nations should not protect, even if they have a “theoretically valid” case: policy makers simply do 
not know enough about markets, the argument goes, to understand which protectionist devices will 
work, and which will not (most textbooks make this Hayekian argument without citing its source). But 
this relies on a specific assumption about governments: policy makers are supposedly incapable of 
applying clever economic statecraft. Grubel (1981), for example, conjectures that infant industry 
arguments do not work as protectionism becomes entrenched. Yet he presents instances of picking 
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 Krugman (2002) then proceeds to give “tactical hints” (p. 34). He argues “that it is remarkably easy to make fools of your 
opponents, catching them in elementary errors of logic and fact. This is playing dirty, and I advocate it strongly.” (p. 34-
5, my emphasis). Surely, this must be part irony. 
42
 Bagwell & Staiger (2002) describe protectionist policies as motivated by either political motivations (governments 
concerned about the distribution of national income) or by concern for the maximization of national income. Textbooks 
dismiss protectionist policies even beyond these grounds in more narrative passages.  
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winners through government intervention as illegitimate.43 Furthermore, we do not have enough 
information, he argues, to pick winners and it is difficult to think about the proper social rate of 
discount between the cost of protection now and benefits in the future (p. 158). Grubel unwittingly 
shows his belief in efficient markets when he argues that true market failures are impossible because if 
there were an exploitable benefit, market participants would have already invested. He says that “if 
there are such externalities, the market would respond to them and there would be no need for tariff 
protection”. This is indicative of a view of markets being perfect, expectations being rational, and that 
market imperfections would swiftly be arbitraged away. Grubel claims that if there is supposed 
“underinvestment”, it happens for good reasons (p. 158). Some authors are cognizant of non-economic 
arguments for protectionism that may “not be advantageous from the strictly economic point of view” 
(Gandolfo, 1994, p. 142). Gandolfo argues that under the condition that much information exists and 
the precise dynamic path of the economic system is known and the social discount rate for protection 
can be quantified, then “it is not possible to state in a general way that protection of the infant industry 
is definitely beneficial or definitely harmful”. 
One example of dismissing infant industry protection on purely empirical grounds is given by 
Winters, who derides the “spurious argument for protection” (1985, p. 106), and argues “that free 
trade exposes our producers to ‘unfair’ competition from cheaper factors of production abroad. This 
implies that all cheap imports from abroad should be discouraged, which clearly undermines the whole 
of international trade based on comparative advantage” (Winters, 1985, p. 90).  
Other counter-arguments, mostly against Terms of Trade and Strategic Trade rely on bold 
claims about international relations and economic diplomacy.44 As Terms of Trade interventions and 
Strategic Trade are “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies, nations which implement these policies will 
allegedly face retaliation on the part of other nations, which might escalate into trade and tariff wars. 
Few textbooks go on to substantiate these claims but merely replicate shallow counter-arguments. 
Here, free trade is advocated, but microeconomic analysis abandoned. Instead of pleading ignorance 
about adjacent academic fields, conjectures are offered that belong to other disciplines but serve to 
emphasize the benefits of trade liberalization. This treatment of politics and legislative institutions 
stands out as curious, and a good representative quote comes from the early, more market-friendly, 
Krugman: “Any attempt to pursue sophisticated deviations from free trade will be subverted by the 
political process” (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2006: Chapter 9).45 
With this analysis, I do not endorse protectionist measures that neoclassical visionaries 
oppose. Yet it must be pointed out that the argumentation in textbooks is flawed. There are good 
reasons (e.g. adaptive efficiency) for free trade, with heavy qualifications that will not be discussed 
here.46  
In establishing a dichotomy between free trade and protectionism, we must see a rhetorical 
trick. By giving only autarky as the relevant baseline case, free trade advocacy is without an intelligent 
alternative. Yet this precludes alternative ways of doing economic policy. There may be legitimate 
motives for striving for those alternatives: increasing or decreasing the domestic production or 
consumption of a good; increasing government revenue; changing the distribution of income; 
increasing or decreasing the employment level in a certain industry. What if these goals are 
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 There is some variance in textbooks. Winters (1985), for instance, argues that raising revenues from infant industries is 
legitimate (p. 106). 
44
 But not about infant industry arguments, which are not strictly a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Pugel (2007) gives several 
examples of how restrictions on trade can be disadvantageous: foreign retaliation may be costly through potential trade 
wars; the enforcement costs of upholding the tariff may be high; rent-seeking costs are a waste of societal resources 
(unproductive lobbying); foreign producers may benefit from tariffs which might lead to worsened international 
competitiveness; tariffs might stifle innovation. Generally, it seems that neoclassical theorists are happy to include long 
lists of the disadvantages of trade restrictions without following up the arguments. 
45
 On optimum tariffs, see Bhagwati & Srinivasan (1975); on strategic trade policy, see Brander & Spencer (1983). 
46
 Convincing historical accounts are provided by North (1990) and Landes (1998), who argue at length that for long-run 
growth, adaptive efficiency matters, rather than allocative efficiency. The policy recommendation hence would be: ‘Be 
open to innovation!’ 
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democratically chosen by citizens? Would this override neoclassical policy recommendations? The 
way that neoclassical theorists attempt to circumvent these debates is usually to argue that whatever a 
population wants, it is never the best policy to set up import barriers for those purposes. The best 
policy is always to first allow trade, and then redistribute according to the desired social goal. That this 
redistribution is always theoretically possible then shifts away controversial questions of distributive 
justice. 
 
4.2 Autarky and There Is No Alternative (TINA) logic 
When answering the question of why free trade is desirable, economists in textbooks always put forth 
the case that without trade we would be worse off in autarky (e.g. Pugel, 2006, p. 15). Free markets 
are the baseline case for neoclassical theorists. An example is Krugman and Obstfeld’s (2006) 
treatment of the pauper labour fallacy, which was also mentioned earlier. “The wages paid to export 
workers in poor countries should be compared not to what workers get in rich countries but to what 
they would get if those export jobs weren’t available.” (Chapter 17, 17-7, my emphasis). In similar 
fashion, Pugel (2007) asks, “Does trade lead to harm and to exploitation of workers in the South, as 
indicated by the low wages (and/or poor working conditions)?” (p. 40). To this, he gives the answer 
that the poor would be paid low wages anyway. In effect, he takes comparative advantage as 
exogenous without contemplating different reasons why there may be a comparative advantage in low 
wage labour. Safe to say, this is a very weak normative benchmark. With such a benchmark, free trade 
must be endorsed because ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). With this dichotomy, tariffs are seen as 
restrictions and in need of justification as well as the outcome of special interests (rather than, for 
example, as an instance of legitimate collective determination). This is the problem of TINA logic: the 
inability to envision alternative values and worlds. The baseline account invoked favours the status 
quo distribution. Neoclassical theorists create a dichotomy between either free trade or protectionism 
(employing an “us versus them” rhetoric). This dichotomy is so pervasive that even critics of 
contemporary neoclassical economics sometimes fall into the trap of perpetuating this binary 
distinction. Even critics of mainstream economics are sometimes unwittingly held capture by 
conventional terminology and combative rhetoric.  
 
4.3 Natural Distributions, Just Deserts 
In the following sections, I will provide evidence of how normative trade theorists deal with matters of 
efficiency and equity beyond the theoretical choice of the efficiency criterion. Trade theorists seem to 
know better how societies should trade off material progress for matters of equity – or more precisely, 
pretend that no “problem” of redistribution exists theoretically. Let us highlight the quote by Mankiw 
again. “Whereas efficiency is an objective goal that can be judged on strictly positive grounds, equity 
involves normative judgments that go beyond economics and enter into the realm of political 
philosophy” (Mankiw 2007, p. 148, my emphasis).  
The influence of the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics (FTWE) on the 
neoclassical economic vision is tremendous – yet, paradoxically, difficult to see and seldom studied 
(the important exception is Blaug, 2007) The FTWE are presented as mathematical proof that 
competitive markets are Pareto efficient and that frictionless redistribution is possible if so desired. 
These mathematical findings are uncritically accepted as relevant for policy discourse (see Stiglitz, 
1991, for limitations). In some international economics textbooks, it is explicitly said that the two 
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics provide a rationale for treating matters of efficiency 
and matters of distribution separately. Yet, this move is no more than a brief attempt to justify the 
dominant focus on efficiency. I could not find a deeper analysis of the FTWEs and their significance 
for evaluating economic outcomes in any of the textbooks surveyed. But it is precisely the institutional 
complexity of actual (international) trade which renders the abstract ‘findings’ of the FTWE 
(assuming perfect competition etc.) moot for normative trade theory and makes the separation of 
matters of efficiency and distribution highly artificial. 
The FTWE offer theoretical ‘proof’ of the possibility of redistribution without losses in 
efficiency, or of the gains from free market activity through state intervention or other transfers. As 
lump sum transfers are deemed theoretically possible, politics can simply redistribute after gains from 
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free markets have been obtained. In this sense, free markets are prior to redistribution. One thing that 
the FTWE arguments miss is that this redistribution rarely takes place. Redistribution remains 
hypothetical and not actual. Secondly, and rhetorically more insidious and conceptually interesting, is 
the fact that the term redistribution is really a misnomer, as it implies that there is a natural 
distribution (whatever distribution results from free markets) and that policy interventions are re-
distributions. This term has crept into the political economy literature, with redistribution understood 
as the effect on the distribution that the state makes with taxes, subsidies and regulation. Yet the 
decision to allow free markets is itself a purposeful distribution (Polanyi, 1944; Dugger, 1996). 
Surprisingly, with the exception of Blaug (2007), there is next to no critical or heterodox critique of 
the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics and their interpretation in the standard neoclassical 
account. I will now present a more practical example concerning the neoclassical endorsement of 
natural distributions which particularly explains what neoclassicals understand as natural. 
In public debates about whether losers from trade should be compensated, technology is often 
cited. The core argument is that trade is just like a technology that enables better consumption and 
that, hence, what is ‘owed’ to losers from trade should also be ‘owed’ to losers from technological 
advancement.47 As a consequence, neoclassical trade theorists are often confronted with the argument 
that losers from trade are ‘owed’ something (job security, compensation for income losses or income 
risk, job-seeking stipends or funds to increase their skills). Textbooks and neoclassical theorists in the 
public debate offer the same view on what individual economic agents can legitimately expect in the 
economy: whatever the competitive economy ends up rewarding them with. Neoclassical theorists 
argue that it is not legitimate to assume that one’s job will exist forever, and that for this reason losing 
one’s job, as part of the natural functioning of the economy, should be expected. 
Neoclassical theorists try to portray the economic effects of trade as analogous to the effects 
that technological advancement has. Technological advancement, in our current age, has a near 
unparalleled positive reputation. In the public sphere, technological advancement is synonymous with 
progress of civilisation. It is this reputation that neoclassical theorists wittingly or unwittingly want to 
profit from when likening the effects of trade to the effects of technological change. Just as technology 
has overwhelmingly positive effects, so, supposedly, has trade. In addition, however, the popular 
embracing of technological progress is a distinctly secular idea of progress – hope is associated with 
technology and, usually, there is a common belief that we will all increasingly profit from better 
technology and will be steadily better off as civilization advances.48 I submit that a similar teleological 
belief informs the stance of neoclassical theorists on international trade and free markets. In addition 
to this, I propose that neoclassical theorists also largely buy into a specific pre-conceived notion of 
distributive justice – namely ‘natural distribution’ (based on the marginal productivity principle).  
Normative trade theory puts forward a view on what individuals can legitimately expect to 
receive in the economy. Distribution is determined by each individual’s marginal productivity. This is 
what each individual ‘deserves’ to receive and for which each individual is ‘responsible’ (by 
extension, this is also true for the nation). Friedman (1962, Chapter 5), for instance, makes it explicit 
that the price of labour – that is, wages – is set at the intersection between supply and demand and 
therefore expresses what society wants and ought to be considered desirable. DeMartino (2000) has 
similarly argued that there exists an ‘implicit distributional commitment’ in the neoclassical vision. In 
neoclassical theory, societal worth is decided in the marketplace. The view is that marginal 
productivity determines legitimate individual wages and hence legitimate social contribution: “each of 
us should be compensated in direct measure to our net contribution. Those with higher ‘productivity’ 
should receive higher reward” (p. 49). Apart from an implicit distributional commitment there is also 
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the basis of monetary measures (loss of income, increasing income risk, job displacement). This is because I do not want 
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an implicit commitment to end-result principles of justice (as Nozick termed them) within mainstream 
economic trade theory. End-result principles of justice evaluate a distribution of goods and services as 
desirable without taking into account how the distribution came about. What matters is the level of 
productivity, not the source of it, which is accepted as exogenous. This means that every individual or 
nation is wholly responsible for his own productivity. This pays no attention to the fact that individual 
productivity is a function of a history of productivity in the community in which the individual was 
brought up. In the neoclassical vision, productivity just exists – individuals are atomistic, timeless, not 
part of an evolutionary system. Yet, with “nothing but the market to appeal to for income, individual 
hardship is inevitable” in the neoclassical economy (Caporaso & Levine, 1992, p. 39). Non-
intervention in markets is often justified both on normative grounds and for reasons of feasibility. Due 
to epistemological constraints of policy makers, it is unlikely that government intervention will result 
in an optimization of individual preference satisfaction. Redistribution is not feasible. Additionally, 
government intervention is inherently paternalistic. Governments should set the framework rules to 
enable fair gambles and the resulting just distributions.  
The theme of the moralization of “natural distributions” is present throughout 
microeconomics. It is held by John Bates Clark (1899) and others that there exists a pre-political 
process by which benefits and burdens are distributed. Together with a teleological view of history, 
neoclassical theorists look at trade this way: free markets are considered natural and the resulting 
distributions are similarly ‘natural’ in the sense that these distributions are just history playing out 
while, collectively, society is on the road of progress. In a competitive economy, losses are part of the 
game.49 
The problem with this view is that it cannot make sense of morally repugnant outcomes or 
processes in markets. There is no such thing as a “moral market failure” in the neoclassical vision. 
There is no instance that could judge an economic outcome as reasonable over and above what 
individual rational actors decide to do.  
To invoke just briefly a modified thought experiment from Robert Nozick (1974), think of 
Wilt Chamberlain, one of the best basketball players who earns a great amount of money due to his 
exceptional talent. If thousands of people are willing to pay a bonus charge to see him play, does this 
justify the incredible wealth he will amass with this? Nozick argues Chamberlain does deserve his 
earnings, and in fact that no other economic arrangement would be compatible with a strong 
commitment to individual liberty, and specifically property rights (p. 160). Free economic exchanges 
are just individual instances of voluntary acts and the end result is just if its constituent parts are just. 
Interferences are violations of core rights. This perspective does not allow formulating what is 
“reasonable” from any other perspective than the individual one. Voluntary exchanges are legitimate 
and whatever they result in is also just if the point of departure, the initial distribution, was also just. 
Yet, is the Chamberlain example not an instance of a moral market failure in the sense that there is a 
collective action problem preventing individuals from jointly determining a lower wage for 
Chamberlain? What if all sports fans had come together to agree that they will all only pay a fraction 
of the bonus charge to see him play, because they agree that a purely market-based remuneration 
based on marginalist principles would be excessive? Why is this not the appropriate standard for 
assessing what sports stars like Chamberlain could reasonably expect to earn?50 
Instead, for normative trade theorists, the market is a system of voluntary exchanges between 
individuals who are rationally self-interested and are endowed with property rights, acting completely 
independently of one another. The very set-up of this model precludes the deliberative approach from 
attempting to collectively find “reasonable” answers to problems of economic policy that go beyond 
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what individuals, if left to themselves, would decide in the marketplace. The neoclassical vision is 
even more simplistic: transactions that take place are welfare-improving for both parties. They are 
voluntary, so that any power relations or hierarchies between contracting parties are generally 
assumed away. Exploitation, domination and coercion do not feature in the vision; the initial 
distribution is never called into question. Markets increase opportunities to increase satisfaction – and 
that is that. In fact, it is logically impossible in the neoclassical system to harm someone in a market 
exchange, because individuals only ever enter the market with the intent of performing voluntary 
transactions. By definition, markets are legitimate, fair and desirable.  
In a moralized debate on trade, little room is made for legitimate claims of losers. Losers from 
trade are losers from unlucky gambles. Losers in trade are not owed anything, as they can be held 
largely responsible for the decision they have taken to work in a specific (protected) industry. Indeed, 
in free markets winning and losing is not something that politics should be concerned with. There may 
be economic harm done in fair competition – but there is no moral wrong done in free competition. 
Yet the neoclassicals do not outline conditions for what counts as legitimate competition and what 
does not. Some reject talk of legitimate expectations to compensation completely, in the spirit of 
Hayek (1979). For him, the term ‘distributive justice’ or ‘social justice’ can in principle “have no 
application to the result of a market economy: there can be no distributive justice where no one 
distributes” (p. 1). In the case of trade, then, the argument is best presented by Kapstein (1994): 
 
Trade-displaced workers do not have any greater claim to taxpayer-sponsored assistance programs 
than other workers, and indeed they may be owed less. The reason is that, to the extent workers in 
import-sensitive industries accrued a rent during the pre-free trade era (since they were protected 
by trade barriers that pushed factor prices to artificially high levels), they have no claim on state 
funds now that those barriers – and, in turn, their rents – have been reduced (p. 261). 
 
It is argued that compensating the losers from liberalization is doubly wrong and would add insult to 
injury. The tariffs hurt society enough already, and now the protected want compensation on top of 
that? The thought behind this goes as follows: citizens have a moral claim to free markets, and 
inefficiency is morally unjustified. Hence, when some industries are wrongly subsidized at collective 
disadvantage, the protectionist devices ought to be abolished and the community ought to be 
compensated for the infringement of the right to free markets. Markets should be free, and harm from 
trade is not a wrong. The losers are owed nothing, as they were the ones choosing deliberately to 
engage in a voluntary gamble in which they happened to lose. This response is close to what luck 
egalitarians call ‘bad option luck’. In fact it is possible to read the strong moral undertones in the 
textbooks when protected industries are talked about: free trade is not only efficient but also demanded 
by justice, and protected industries do not deserve to be artificially shielded from world market prices. 
With regards to individual losers in trade, what is implicit in these arguments is that workers 
intentionally chose to work in the industry they are working in. Hence, workers are responsible for 
picking the ‘wrong’ (e.g. non-comparative advantage) industry. Winners do not owe losers anything. 
An example is Landsburg (2008), who in public debate is providing a mix of consequentialist 
and deontological arguments. The self-described libertarian economist is publicly assessing whether 
losers from trade should expect compensation. What is special about his argument is that the entire op-
ed is inserted into Mankiw’s textbook (Mankiw, 2011, p. 187) and nicely represents the neoclassical 
vision. 
The argument in favour of free trade is familiar in that it is said that Americans win as a group 
when engaging in trade. Landsburg offers that the relevant baseline criterion for evaluation would be a 
world without trade, just as the analysis goes in the textbooks. Landsburg argues that we do not owe 
the losers from economic activity anything. He gives the example of an online pharmacy that a buyer 
chooses as his preferred place to buy medicine over another, local, pharmacy. Landsburg argues that 
even if the buyer was a customer for years at the local pharmacy, there is no need to compensate the 
pharmacist. Nor is there one to compensate your landlord or other businesses that you do not use 
anymore. This is because this all falls under the notion of ‘fair play’ in a market economy. Landsburg 
then makes the claim that our “moral instincts say that we owe them nothing” and that “[p]ublic policy 
should not be designed to advance moral instincts that we all reject every day of our lives” (p. 1). 
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Landsburg makes a deontological argument (without highlighting that it is one). He entertains the 
following hypothetical: what if bullying was an occupation and we were to change the rules in such a 
way as to make it less profitable to bully – ought we to compensate the bullies now? Of course not, he 
argues, as bullying is inherently immoral. Just like inhibitions to trade, the neoclassical trade theory 
here finds a good explicit representation in Landsburg’s claims: restrictions to trade are inherently 
immoral, on top of being inefficient: 
 
Bullying and protectionism have a lot in common. They both use force (either directly or through 
the power of the law) to enrich someone else at your involuntary expense. If you’re forced to pay 
$20 an hour to an American for goods you could have bought from a Mexican for $5 an hour, 
you’re being extorted (p. 2). 
 
Landsburg is an excellent example of faulty neoclassical vision thinking. First, he thinks in binary 
categories: it’s either free trade or protectionism. Second, he thinks that trade that is not free is 
necessarily enriching some at the involuntary expense of others, as the only relevant “expense” to 
consider is one of efficiency. All that matters for a normative evaluation of the example are the free 
choices of individual economic participants. In such a perspective, no independent importance can be 
attributed to political values and appeals to, for example, democracy or community. Inhibiting trade is 
as unjust as bullying; no other reasons regarding the social and political good are admissible to 
convince us otherwise. Lastly, unlike bullying, being in a protected industry is hardly a free choice. 
Bhagwati (1996) and others refer to “kaleidoscopic comparative advantage”: they argue that in our 
world economy today, comparative advantage in practice resembles a “sort of musical chairs”, where 
“one day I have comparative advantage in X and you in Y, and tomorrow it may be the other way 
around, and then back again” (p. 239). In the light of this volatility in international trade markets, this 
may be just one simple argument why notions of responsibility for allegedly “picking the wrong 
industry” are misplaced. If Bhagwati’s contention is true and kaleidoscopic comparative advantage in 
practice is constantly changing “what a country is good at,” then the contention that industries are 
“freely chosen” by workers becomes implausible. Being at the whim of changing world markets, it is 
hard to maintain that factors of production (workers) are responsible for their own economic well-
being. Individual marginal productivity is not a good yardstick for social contribution in a world of 
volatile markets for other reasons: even if it were possible to empirically determine social 
contribution, it would not make it morally right to follow the principle of marginal productivity. 
 
5.1 Polities, Politics and the Neoclassical Vision 
Textbooks present a deeply impoverished account of the polities it theorizes about. When textbooks 
write about policy they mean national policy. Neoclassical trade theory hence, in its ambition to give 
policy advice, takes the entity of the nation as given. Pugel (2007) argues in the beginning of his 
textbook: “As long as countries exist, international economics will be a body of analysis distinct from 
the rest of economics […] international economics is a special field of study because nations are 
sovereign” (p. 10). Pugel continues to argue 
 
International economics is different [because] [n]ations are not like regions or families. They are 
sovereign, meaning that no central court can enforce its will on them with a global police force 
[…] [a] nation can have its own currency, its own barriers to trading with foreigners, its own 
government taxing and spending, and its own laws of citizenship and residence (p. 5).  
 
Textbooks start, understandably, from a Westphalian conception of international politics and 
economics. Nations grant market-access to each other and hence shape the international trading order. 
In fact, every nation does have “the option to ignore or defy [...] global institutions if it really wants 
to” (p. 10).51 Yet in the neoclassical vision, polities display no discernible difference in terms of the 
values that might set them apart. In the simplest trade models, the only relevant difference between 
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two polities lies in their respective productivity. Gains from trade arise through exploitable 
differences, and political entities vary in their technologies, tastes, resources and factors of production. 
Yet textbooks suppose that nations are uniformly guided by the same values that shape how they 
structure social rules and institutions. Textbooks acknowledge the existence of different polities, but 
disregard the possibility of them engaging in policy decisions that defy economic wisom. The same 
policy recommendations apply to all of them. Yet nations might not share the reasons and normative 
commitments of the neoclassical vision. Nations are thought to consider only orthodox economics – 
and nothing else. Textbooks are fully unaware of presupposing these values for all political entities. 
There is no scope for real difference. 52 Grubel (1981) says for instance: 
 
There are many economists who believe that the loss of national sovereignty through these 
mechanisms simply is a necessary cost of living in a world of nation-states which are 
interdependent through international trade and the ownership of capital across countries. (p. 601)  
 
Textbooks imply that nations should only want one thing: efficiency – even at the expense of national 
sovereignty. 
A strange relation to politics and political institutions is found in the neoclassical account. 
Politics is considered only in two ways. It is either a nuisance – an obstacle to the preferred social 
organizing mechanism (of the market) – or an ideal role of politics is described: one that repairs 
markets when they fail – hence, it is derivative of the market.  
Joan Robinson (1962) has spelled out why it is important to address ideological questions in 
economic thought. She writes, “Any economic system requires a set of rules, an ideology to justify 
them, and a conscience in the individual which makes him strive to carry them out” (p. 18). In this 
light, politics plays the role of being an obstacle to the market in normative economic trade theory. 
When considering policy recommendations, political economy arguments are often put forward. Trade 
policies in practice are portrayed (probably rightly so) as being dominated by special-interest politics 
and not by actors who altruistically have aggregate national costs and benefits in mind. This forms the 
basis of a vast field of the political economy of trade. Here, the central point of investigation is the 
question of why politics precisely does not lead to a system of free trade (Milner, 2002). But insights 
from the literature dealing with this question are used in textbooks only selectively to argue that free 
trade is better, because special interest politics is pernicious for aggregate national welfare. This is 
represented by the frequent citation of Bhagwati’s classification of certain lobbying as DUP activity, 
“directly unproductive profit-seeking” (Bhagwati, 1982). Political action in textbooks only occurs as 
interference and is always directly unproductive.53 Political competition that is built on ‘good 
intentions’ simply finds no mention in textbooks – civil society is entirely absent. 
Part of this strange understanding of politics is due to the endorsement of preference 
satisfaction theory – a theory that at first sight has little to do with politics. But when one realizes that 
neoclassical theory starts from the assumption that a social optimum is attained if individuals decide 
for themselves, it becomes clearer how politics (and politicians) is regarded as something ‘external’ 
that poses a hindrance to the attainment of happiness. Neoclassical theory cannot comprehend 
approaches that do not place happiness at their centre (for example, Rawls thought that social 
cooperation should not further happiness but that people should be best positioned to pursue valuable 
lives, where valuable may be partially external to the actually held mental states of the individuals in 
question). Anything that is not individual preference satisfaction is paternalism. 
Institutionalist economists like Veblen (1899) have shown how one may actually criticize the 
content of preferences, for instance as anti-consumptionists stress the superfluous nature of 
“conspicuous consumption”. Yet neoclassical theorists do not accept this, clinging to Robbins’s theme 
of the neutrality of economics. For them, “[v]iews on what are essential and luxury goods differ 
widely” and “reveal paternalistic attitudes which most economists urge should be disregarded” 
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(Grubel, 1981, p. 603). Grubel, for instance, claims in his textbook that “[g]overnments not willing to 
accept the public’s judgments on what goods are desired face the very uncomfortable and difficult 
problem of selecting goods for production by what must by necessity be undemocratic means” (p. 
603). Distributions that are not made by the market are here branded as ‘undemocratic’. This, then, 
would be a very thin understanding of democracy: It consists of whatever people want economically. 
The neoclassical vision hence exhibits an uncompromising attention to individuals (which some 
philosophers may very well find attractive), as well as a high aversion to ‘coercion’. This is a very 
unreflective ideal of freedom as ‘freedom from’. 
The attractiveness of the reductionist view of individuals is that with only a few given 
variables (endowments, preferences, technology, rules of the game) we can know with precision what 
agents will choose. The notion of rationality is an example of a hybrid between a positive and a 
normative concept. Hausman & McPherson (2006) claim that rationality is, at its core, a normative 
notion (not necessarily an ethical one, however) that states: “You ought to behave like a rational 
being”. This is true, particularly with relation to the theory of preference satisfaction. Rationality may 
be a description, but, as Elster (2000) notes, such a descriptive theory depends on a theory of rational 
belief-formation – which gives credence to the preference satisfaction framework (p. 37). If human 
beings are assumed to be rational, it seems right to give more weight to what are ‘well-founded’ 
beliefs.  
Neoclassical economics has an inbuilt theory of what motivates human beings, and the theory 
is unified in a way unlike anything the classical economists offered. Individuals attempt to achieve the 
highest level of want satisfaction. In some sense, this is also a very deterministic theory – individual 
economic agents necessarily act according to this overarching goal. Economic agents are forever 
choosing between alternatives, ranking them depending on their preference orderings in a rational 
(transitive and complete) and internally consistent way, maximizing welfare. Neoclassical consumers 
seek subjective satisfaction, utility or happiness – in a way modelled on early utilitarian theories. 
Veblen, the founding father of institutionalism, provided an early critique of this implicit view of 
human nature. His targets were the “Austrian” economists of the 1890s, but I think his critique applies 
to the neoclassical vision today in equal measure. For Veblen (1898), the reason for  
 
the Austrian failure seems to lie in a faulty conception of human nature [...This is because] the 
human material with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that is to 
say, in terms of a passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature. The 
psychological and anthropological preconceptions of the economists have been those which were 
accepted by the psychological and social sciences some generations ago. The hedonistic 
conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the 
area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated definitive 
human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace 
him in one direction or another. (p. 373) 
 
If both consumers and producers maximize – utility, satisfaction, consumer welfare, profits – then 
from this stems the second view of politics from the neoclassical perspective: politics as derivative of 
the market: The role for politics and political institutions is to deal with externalities. Politics ought to 
set the rules of the economy such that the private costs and benefits that firms experience are brought 
in line with social costs and benefits. However, it is unclear what the basis for defining something as a 
relevant externality is in the first place. This is a classic point at which, in my view, only political 
philosophy can help provide answers. To give an example: consider the production and exchange of 
goods, such as chemical products, between person (a) and (b) which leads to a deterioration of the 
quality of life of (c), a farmer working downstream. Only a comprehensive moral framework can give 
the scope conditions under which a tax or any governmental intervention in the exchange is justified. 
In the example, one could argue that sustained exchange in the above case violates a principle of 
moral equality in the form of (c) being harmed as a consequence of the exchange. But what if (c) is a 
herd of sheep, or the environment in general? Are damages to these affected parties negligible when 
they do not play a role in social welfare functions? In short: political philosophy is needed to define 
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what constitutes a relevant externality. In the case of trade, political philosophy is required to answer 
the question of whether distributive effects of trade that make individuals better or worse off constitute 
such relevant externalities.54 Terms such as social marginal cost, market failure or social cost of 
production display the same problem: they are frequently used in textbooks, but their necessary 
philosophical or moral underpinning is never provided. Instead, the terms are interwoven into formal 
analysis so as to suggest that their meaning is obvious and uncontested.55 
Textbooks and neoclassical theorists consistently err in favour of markets and in disfavour of 
the state. The role of the state is to install regulation that limits positive or negative externalities 
through the price system and not apart from it. There is no room for deontology here: the state’s 
function is only to be the handmaiden of the market (understood as the price-system), to repair it, aid 
its functioning and certainly not to go beyond it – for example by way of prohibiting certain 
transactions on non-economic grounds. 
 
5.2 Institutional Preconditions for Market Exchange 
In none of the textbooks is there a systematic inquiry into what the institutional preconditions for trade 
are. Markets require norms to sustain themselves. Yet the framework that enables markets is not 
created by them. Markets do not define and institute property rights; they cannot put into place their 
own conditions. The institutionalist critique regards markets as more than a price-system. Even if one 
expands the scope of what is meant by market only slightly, for example, as a system of property 
rights (i.e. rights of ownership that determine scope of use, sale, access to assets), neoclassical 
theorists are pressed to defend their claims.56 That this is necessary has been argued by Hoaas (1993), 
who states that in economics textbooks between the 1920s and 1950s, frequently entire chapters were 
“devoted to historical and institutional description.” These chapters would explain the historical 
genesis of the contemporary economic order. Those accounts have now completely vanished from 
textbooks.  
So while neoclassical models simply assume the feasibility of some country A trading with 
some country B, they also simply assume that there exists a system of property rights, money and 
contracts embedded in a legal order making these elements enforceable. Arguably, there are cultural 
preconditions that are no less important in sustaining a capitalist economy that go unmentioned in 
models or their interpretation. Broader sociological and anthropological foundations are needed to 
make sense of the analysis. Yet, mainstream normative economic trade theory as found in the 
textbooks tacitly implies a working institutional set-up which includes a government that is able to 
levy taxes and to (hypothetically or actually) redistribute wealth in society, and which would be able 
to identify, when Kaldor-Hicks is taken seriously, who exactly the losers in society from trade are in 
order to calculate whether there is a net benefit from employing free trade. In order to counteract 
externalities, someone needs to instate clever regulation – yet the existence of a redistributive state is 
simply presupposed. Of special importance in this regard is the existence of individual enforceable 
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property rights. As Max Weber (1947) already underlined, the “[e]xchange economy involves a 
complete network of contractual relationships, each of which originates in a deliberately planned 
process of acquisition of powers of control and disposal”. Weber recognized that the legal order was 
“an indispensable basis for control of the material means of production” (p. 171).  
All this points to the plausibility of a normative counter-vision that sees markets as 
normatively and factually an “instituted process”. Drawing on the ideas of Polanyi (1957), 
institutionalists like Dugger (1989) understand the market as man-made: far from beyond “human 
will”, markets are not “a product of natural law”, but instead the outcome of “collective action” (p. 
607). In “The Great Transformation”, Polanyi (1957) insists, 
 
There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being 
merely by allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton manufactures – the leading free trade 
industry – were created by the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and direct wage 
subsidies, laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state […] (p. 139). 
 
For Polanyi, a period that was regarded as liberal had seen a build-up of “an administrative machine of 
great complexity which stands in as constant need of repair, renewal, reconstruction, and adaption to 
new requirements as the plant of a modern manufactory”. Polanyi then talks about the “enormous 
increase in the administrative functions of the state” that fulfilled liberal tasks. He sees economic 
liberalism as a “social project which should be put into effect for the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number; laissez faire was not a method to achieve a thing, it was the thing to be achieved.” (p. 139). 
Soon, Polanyi argues, 
 
[t]he road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, 
centrally organized and controlled interventionism. To make Adam Smith’s ‘simple and natural 
liberty’ compatible with the needs of a human society was a most complicated affair [...] the 
introduction of free markets, far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, and 
intervention, enormously increased their range (pp. 139-140).57  
 
This contrasts with the neoclassical vision, in which the distribution of assets and endowments is 
exogenously given and property rights simply exist. What I argue is that the neoclassical vision has an 
implicit view of these matters that resembles the school of thought that defends the idea of “natural 
rights.” Yet the burden of proof is on the neoclassical theorists to show that this is indeed the way in 
which property rights – and other institutions necessary to sustain economic policy – should be 
understood. For these theorists, rights do not come into being with a political system, but are somehow 
pre-political. Whether or not we have these rights is not something that I want to discuss here. I will 
only argue that there is the need for politics to actualize rights (whether positive or natural). We might 
have natural property rights – but a fully-fledged state is required to sustain any economic policy – and 
particularly one of free trade. Free international trade necessarily involves institutions that collect and 
act on the preferences of their citizens, ranging from trade officials and negotiators to customs 
workers, all embedded in a stable legal order. Hence, there is need for rules governing exchange; there 
is the need to assign responsibility for the external costs of economic activity; agreements must be 
established about the scope and content of property rights, contracts must be enforced and must 
outline which economic transfers are permissible (e.g. what counts as theft, extortion, exploitation, 
coercion and fraud). Social institutions, and particularly legislative activity, is required to define 
markets – prescribing the permitted scope, depth and content of market exchanges. 
 
                                                     
57
 Polanyi argues that in an ironic turn liberal economic policy will often lead to spontaneous restrictions and counter-
movements to free markets. This is the famous idea of Polanyi’s double movement. He shows that anti-laissez-faire 
policy is just as purposeful an action as laissez-faire policy. Yet why do economic liberals or neoclassical visionaries 
only understand market forces as natural but not associated counter-movements? 
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5.3 The Role of the Economist 
In the textbook by Grubel (1981), the following remark is made relating to community indifference 
curves:  
 
[T]he gains in community income may lead to a redistribution such that one person’s income 
decreases absolutely and all of the community’s net gains, plus some more, accrue to the second 
person. This creates the greatest analytical difficulties; it frequently takes place in connection with 
the opening up of international trade (p. 36). 
 
Modern welfare economics, says Grubel, cannot judge this because it involves interpersonal 
comparisons of welfare “which cannot be undertaken legitimately because economists have no 
objective measuring tool for this task”. Grubel concedes “some ambiguities in the interpretation of 
welfare gains” (p. 38) but basically mirrors the accepted wisdom since Lionel Robbins. Ethics out of 
economics! Who are we to objectively measure welfare? 
Other textbooks similarly claim that value judgments can be circumvented by endorsing 
Pareto – and, because this is very hard to achieve, we should endorse a basic one-dollar, one-vote 
metric as a measure of well-being – every dollar of gain is just as important as every other dollar of 
gain or loss, regardless of who the gainers or losers are (Pugel, 2006).  
 
Economists have tended to resolve the matter by imposing the value judgment that we shall call 
the one-dollar, one-vote metric here and throughout this book. The one-dollar, one-vote metric 
says that the analyst will value any dollar of gain or loss equally, regardless of who experiences it. 
The metric implies a willingness to judge trade issues on the basis of their effects on aggregate 
well-being, without regard to their effects on the distribution of well-being (Pugel, 2006, p. 30) . 
 
Matters of distributive justice are rhetorically taken out of the equation, while, implicitly, inefficiency 
is regarded as unjust. Pugel similarly says that “we cannot compare the welfare effects on different 
groups without imposing our subjective weights to the economic stakes of each group” (p. 26). Hence, 
we may say something about effects on different groups but not whether one win offsets another loss, 
because “[t]he result depends on our value judgments” (p. 26). Pugel (2006) admits: “Anybody who 
expresses an opinion on whether a tariff is good or bad necessarily does so on the basis of a personal 
value judgment about how important each group is,” which requires the need to “impose a social value 
judgment” (p. 135). This move is typical for textbooks: arguments against preference satisfaction are 
countered by a thinly veiled anti-paternalism. The individual knows best. Yet, actually, the economist 
knows best. By treating entities like the individual and the nation in an analogous way, normative 
trade theorists assume away a moral difference between these levels. By viewing the nation as unitary, 
it becomes easy to use economic theory as supporting the libertarian claim that the “most principled 
case [for free trade] is a moral one: voluntary economic exchange is inherently fair, benefits both 
parties, and allocates scarce resources more efficiently” (Cato, 2011, p. 10). Using microeconomic 
techniques indiscriminately across political levels pretends that there exist formal solutions for the 
problems of free trade policies. Yet, the idea that consensual exchange among mature entities is 
necessarily mutually beneficial is implicitly assumed to be true for individuals as well as nations. 
Exchange of goods between persons is not morally analogous to the exchange of goods between 
countries. International trade has a distinct political dimension to it (domestic distributive effects), 
which trade between persons has not (individuals are the ultimate unit, there cannot be inequality 
‘within’ single persons). The application of microeconomic techniques across different levels of 
inquiry is expressive of this vision. Further, having picked Kaldor-Hicks as the relevant efficiency 
criterion, the mainstream economic trade theorist has implicitly claimed that compensation in society 
could work. This paradoxically undermines Lionel Robbins’ spirit: Kaldor-Hicks introduces value-
judgments and trade-offs between the interests of individuals through the back-door, yet rhetorically 
separates distributional concerns from the evaluation of efficiency.  
Based on a self-understanding of the role of the international economist, Grubel (1981) admits 
in his textbook that it is not satisfactory that economists are the sole guardian of the value of 
efficiency, but argues that the alternative – that economists leave the political sphere to interest groups 
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– is even less desirable. Public capture by interest groups might happen. “Governments need the 
advice of economists about the general welfare implications of these policies” to counterbalance 
lobbying by self-interested interest groups. Grubel argues that economists might be imperfect but that 
lobbying by interest groups is worse:  
 
In this world, the unequal pressures on governments to interfere with free trade are equalized by 
economists who make the case for free trade through direct representations with governments and 
through public education (p. 42).  
 
Grubel believes that economists ought to counter rent-seeking activity through intervention in public 
debate – this is the ideal of an economist as a public intellectual engaging in public education. Grubel 
sees it as the mission of the theorist to endorse the kind of normative analysis he is engaging in. To 
clarify this further, Grubel uses the metaphor of a politician sailing a ship while an economist provides 
a compass for the path of the ship. Although there may be “politically necessary deviations from the 
set course, sight is not lost of the final policy” (pp. 168-169). The final policy is, of course, free trade, 
and Grubel even advocates public education programmes that stress the gains from trade. Textbooks in 
international economics are already the first step on this agenda. The problem is this: while, 
rhetorically, ethics is pushed out of economics, efficiency is moralized in the narratives offered by 
textbooks – and economists are presented as disinterested advocates for the general good. 
 
Conclusion: Yes, Normative Trade Theory is Political Philosophy! 
Neoclassical normative trade theory has established itself as the dominant political philosophy on 
trade, even if it comes in the guise of philosophically disinterested economic theory. From the 
preceding remarks, the contours of normative trade theory should have become clearer. I have 
attempted to outline the areas in which mainstream trade theory engages in questionable normative 
arguments. The term normative as conventionally used in economics is applied to questions of policy 
prescriptions that are economic in nature. However, I have shown that economists have gradually 
come to believe that what they understand as economic is the only thing that matters for policy 
prescriptions, thereby equating arguments from normative economics with questions of what ought to 
be done generally. I have presented the methods, rhetoric and concepts employed by neoclassical 
theorists and have also reconstructed the strange relation that the neoclassical vision maintains to 
political institutions. I have shown how textbook authors present themselves as guardians of the social 
value of efficiency and moralize the case for free trade. Generally, I have shown that the normative 
arguments that economists make are inextricably linked to political philosophy. 
Hutchison (1979) once distinguished the historical-institutionalist Smithian methodology of 
economics, which relates “technical economics to wider intellectual currents” from the abstract-
deductionist Ricardian methodology, which “strictly divorces economic analysis from entanglements 
with historical analysis in other social sciences” (in Sally, 2002, p. 18). This critique of normative 
trade theory and the unravelling of its premises has hopefully contributed to the former endeavour 
while criticizing the latter. From the preceding critical analysis, it might be inferred that normative 
trade theory requires a more Smithean approach in order to reach convincing policy 
recommendations. One solution would be to increasingly engage in Smithean economics, or to 
become an institutionalist economist. Instead, I propose to go to the other extreme and start directly 
with the normative vision that should guide economics and the shape of the economy. There is a need 
for a counter-vision that sets reasonable limits on efficiency as the prime social value to be pursued. 
This will make policy makers (and others who should be interested in normatively ambitious 
economic policy) aware of the fundamental questions that have to be asked first, at a more 
fundamental or abstract level, before following neoclassical policy advice. Not even only 
institutionalist, or current heterodox, economics can answer the question of what kind of economic 
policy there ought to be. Broader, and more explicitly normative accounts of distributive justice and 
the role of markets as social organizing principles are required to start answering the question.  
This paper had the ambition of rescuing the term normative trade theory from a contingent 
historical approach in economics. So far, the term has unfortunately been restricted to mainstream 
international economics. The aim of this piece has been to argue that in the light of contestable 
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normative premises in economic theory in general, and in trade theory in particular, we need to 
question the current prerogative of economic theory to claim the term normative trade theory for itself 
and to explore its limits.  
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